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A. Pretrial Intervention Defined
The concept of pretrial diversion of alleged
offenders out of the formal criminal justice system is
1
by no means a recent discovery. In one form or another
pretrial diversion has been practiced and accepted in
this country for years and has existed under the titles
2 3
of "police discretion" and "prosecutorial discretion."
Within recent years there has been a movement afoot
k
for formalizing the prosecutor's exercise of discretion
and this has resulted in a differentiation between Pretrial
5
Diversion and other forms of discretionary treatment.
There seem to be certain generally recognized
6
characteristics of a pretrial diversion program. One
of these characteristics is a structured program which
provides for early delivery of rehabilitative services
to the enrolled participant. This rehabilitation
program can be directed at correcting any social or
behavioral problem, but most frequently it will attempt
to correct unemployment, drug or alcohol addiction,
7
or general adjustment problems.
If the participant successfully completes his
prescribed program, he will not be prosecuted, but
- 1 -

should he fail to satisfy the requirments, he will
be returned for criminal processing.
The National Pretrial Intervention Service Center
has recognized three essential characteristics of a
Pretrial Diversion program: (1) diversion of the
accused out of the criminal process occurs before formal
adjudication of guilt or innocence; (2) existence of
formal eligibility and procedural standards for diversion;
and (3) availability of community-based social and reha-
bilitative services for the accused immediately after
8
diversion.
It is obvious that the most significant difference
between the well known and long standing practices
of prosecutorial and police discretion and the new
procedures known as Pretrial Diversion is the second
essential characteristic If a prosecutor is to divert
a case from the criminal process, it has always been true
that he must do so before a formal adjudication, for
after adjudication, he no longer has control of the matter.
The third characteristic is likewise not unique, for
prosecutors have long used their power to "encourage"
individuals who are charged with an offense to take
advantage of community-based social and rehabilitative
services. Frequently a drunk or an addict has been
encouraged to seek help in return for having charges
reduced or dropped, and many a domestic complaint has
- 2 -

been nulle prossed after the parties sought counseling.
People suspected of suffering from mental illness have
frequently had their criminal charges reduced or dropped
on the condition that they seek professional help.
The second characteristic would then seem to be
the sole unique element for it is the formalized eligibility
and procedural standards that separates the new Pretrial
Diversion from the traditional exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The degree to which these standards are
formalized will vary as will the procedural method
utilized. An internal document issued by the prosecutor
to his staff would meet the letter of this characteristic
but it would not satisfy normally accepted standards
to qualify the practices as a pretrial
diversion program.
There are certain general goals for most pretrial




Reduce - congestion in criminal court dockets and thereby
allow the courts and prosecutors to husband their resources
for the handling of the more serious crimes;
(2) Reduce recidivism by providing for an alternative
to incarceration, - community-based rehabilitation - which
would be more effective and less costly than incarceration;
and
(3) Benefiting society by the training and placement
9
of previously unemployed or underemployed persons.
- 3 -

The priority to be afforded each of these goals
varies between programs, and some programs list additional
goals while others have fewer. The goals of the New
Jersey Pretrial Intervention program have been recognized
as two fold and have been identified by the New Jersey
Supreme Court as "rehabilitation" and "expeditious dis-
position". The court also held that expeditious dispos-
10
ition is subordinate to the rehabilitative function.
New Jersey is thus different in that it has chosen
to make rehabilitation a primary goal, and it has not
emphasized job training and placement as separate goals.
New Jersey has incorporated these commonly recognized
goals into a single goal of rehabilitation, for by pro-
viding services directed at the offender's needs, New
Jersey hopes to rehabilitate the offender and thus min-
imize the likelihood of him becoming a recidivist.
In New Jersey Pretrial Intervention has been
defined as:
"(A) formalized program for selecting from the crim-
inal justice process — . after the filing of the com-
plaint but before trial or the entry of the plea —
adult defendants who appear capable, with the assis-
tance of supervision, counseling or other services,
of showing that they are not likely in the future
to commit criminal or disorderly acts: for removing
such defendants from the ordinary course of prosecution
by postponing further criminal proceedings for periods
of 3 months to one year: and for dismissing charges
against such defendants upon completion of a program
of supervision, counseling or other services, and
upon a showing that the interests of. society may
best be served by such a dismissal."
'k-

The offically stated purposes of the New Jersey
12
program are:
(a) To provide defendants with opportunities to
avoid ordinary prosecution by receiving early
rehabilitation services, when such services can
reasonably be expected to deter future criminal
behavior by the defendant, and when there is an
apparent causal connection between the offense
charged and the rehabilitative need, without which
both the alleged offense and the need to prosecute
might not have occurred.
(b) To provide an alternative to prosecution for
defendants who might be harmed by the imposition
of criminal sanctions as presently administered,
when such an alternative can be expected to serve
as sufficient sanction to deter criminal conduct.
(c) To provide a mechanism for permitting the
least burdensome form of prosecution possible
for defendants charged with "victimless" offenses.
(d) To assist in the relief of presently over-
burdened criminal calendars in order to focus
expenditure of criminal justice resources on
matters involving serious criminality and severe
correctional problems.
(e) To deter future criminal or disorderly behavior
by a defendant/participant in pretrial intervention.
Does New Jersey 1 s Pretrial Intervention program
satisfy the nationally recognized criteria for a pretrial
diversion program? A reading of the enabling rule
13
itself will not give us sufficient information to
answer this question, for it does not tell us when the
diversion occurs, it does not tell us whether there
must exist formal eligibility and procedural standards,
and it does not tell us if there are available community-
based social and rehabilitative services for the accused
immediatly after diversion. The rule itself only indicates
- 5 -

that counties may draw up pretrial intervention programs
for the approval of the Supreme Court. The contents
of these programs are not specified.
The answer to the question is provided by the
official guidelines for the programs published by order
of the Supreme Court.
Guideline 6 provides that "Applications for PTI
should be made as soon as possible after commencement
of proceedings, but, in an indictable offense, not later
than 25 days after original plea to the indictment."
It is apparent that this does not in a literal sense
preclude diversion after a formal adjudication of guilt
or innocence, but as will be seen later, in practice
15
this guideline is interpreted to have such a meaning.
The remaining guidelines are in and of themselves
a set of formal eligibility and procedural requirements
and thus clearly satisfy that criteria.
In order to determine if any single county program
approved by the Supreme Court has available community-
based social and rehabilitative services for the accused
iramediatly after diversion , it would be necessary to
review each county program plan submitted for approval,
and such a check would show that such services are
available in all counties and, in fact, a program
16
without such services would not be approved.
It is thus clear that the New Jersey Pretrial
- 6 -

Intervention program contains the essential elements
necessary to be recognized by the National Pretrial
Intervention Service Center as a valid pretrial diversion
program.
B. Purpose
By the simple expedient of adopting a court rule,
R 3:28 in 1970, the Supreme Court planted the seed
for a program that has since spawned the growth of a
bureaucracy which attempts to justify the existence of over 200
state employees and the expenditure of an unknown amount
17
of money well in excess of $2,265,263.00 per year. The
name of the program is Pretrial Intervention and the
name of the bureaucrary is the Pretrial Services Division
of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
In an unprecedented speech before a joint session
18
of the State Legislature, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey made certain comments regarding
the existing program. He s-tated that Pretrial Intervention
"as its name implies. . .intervenes. . .to remove certain
accused defendants from the revolving door corruption
and futility of imprisonment where that course is
19
warranted and compatible with public safety." He
further noted that the individuals who were enrolled
in the program were "usually first-time offenders
accused of non-violent crimes" and said that by "removing
- 7 -

such marginal offenders from further prosecution, the
pressures on the criminal calandars would be relieved
and once these less serious offenses were eliminated
from trial, judges and prosecutors would be able to
devote their attention to important cases relating to
20
the public security, "
The primary purpose of this paper will be to take
a look at the New Jersey Pretrial Intervention Program
to see to what extent it accomplishes its goals.
In this time of large national deficits and unbal-
anced state and local budgets, it seems most appropriate
to review major programs which involve the expenditure
of large amounts of tax revenue to determine if the goals
of a program are realistic and, if they are, has the
program lived up to the expectations of its proponents
and met these goals. It seems obvious that if the
program's goals are not being met then either the goals
must be changed or the program must be changed to
enable it to meet the goals.




(I)t has been amazingly simple, from the criminal
justice system viewpoint, to implement a PTI program
once the necessary desire and committment were obtained
from the prosecutors and judges. The watchword had
been informality and flexibility- and current programs
have largely existed without legal difficulties or
challenge. This has undoubtedly been helpful to the
fledgling movement. .. .However, by virtue of its rapid
growth and nature, pretrial intervention must be prepared
to pass legal muster.
- 8 -

Over the past eight years Pretrial Intervention
programs in New Jersey have expended large amounts of
tax revenue
y
and it seems that the time has long since
passed when the proponents of future expenditures
should be required to justify their requests.
It is not my intent to say that a humanitarian
program such as pretrial intervention that has as its
primary goal rehabilitation, must be cost effective
in a business sense, but it is felt that, to justify
future expenditures, the program should have some sound
basis for showing that it does in fact rehabilitate,
and does this in a relatively cost efficient manner
as compared to other similar programs.
The Chief Justice's remarks raise a number of
questions which include: (1 ) would the typical first
time offender accused of a non-violent crime have
been caught prior to the establishment of the pretrial
intervention program in the "revolving-door corruption
and futility of imprisonment"? (2) has the program
truthfully relieved pressures on the criminal caland&rs?
and(3) what hard evidence exists to support these claims?
The Chief Justice specifically raised what he
called understandable public questions and attempted to
22
answer them. The questions and answers were:
(1) Is this program compatible with legislative policy?
Answer: It is.
(2) Does it threaten public security? Answer: No.
- 9 -

(3) Does the court rule invade the executive authority
of the prosecutor? Answer: No,
(ij.) Is the program potentially successful? Answer: It
is by the evidence available.
(5) What is the stake of society and the taxpayer in
pretrial intervention? Answer: Very high, both as to
the security of the community and the taxpayers pocketbook.
Despite the affirmative sound of these statements,
to date no real attempt to determine the social and
economic effectiveness of the PTI concept has been made.
What few reports have been generated have been idealistic,
self-serving, statistically invalid descriptions of how
the concept should work. This is true both on the local
and the national level.
Chief Justice Hughes stated, "the true test (of the
programs effectiveness) of course, is measured by recidivism
23
that is, re-arrest after successful program participation."
This, as will be later shown, is an unrealistic evaluator,
for it is not sufficiently accurate nor does it show to
what degree the program meets its goals. The American
Friends Service Committee has noted that "We have no way
of determining the real rate of recividism because most
criminals are undetected and most suspected criminals do
2k
not end up being convicted." Statistics would seem to
25
support this evaluation for although there were 396,^8 crime
index offenses in New Jersey in 1976, there were only 71,211
27
arrests and these only resulted in 1^,858 convictions.
Thus it can be seen that if a successful program part-
icipant decides to commit another crime index offense there is only
- 10 -

a one in six chance that he will be arrested
and declared a recividist.
The period in which the program participant is
followed, the effectiveness of the information gathering
system, and the true nature of any comparison groups
are all factors that will greatly influence the validity
of any recividism rates.
The Friends Committee made another comment that
really goes to the heart of the point that recividism
is not the proper scale for evaluating the success or
failure of the program. They commented:
"Using rates of recividism as the criterion for
evaluating the success or failure of criminal justice
programs poses more fundemental problems than the
Unreliability of the statistics. Surely it is ironic
that although treatment ideology purports to look
beyond the criminal's crime to the whole personality,
and bases its claims to sweeping discretionary power
on this rationale, it measures its success against the
single factor of an absence of reconviction for a
criminal act. Whether or not the subject of the treatment
process has acquired greater self understanding, a
a sense of purpose and power in his own destiny, or
a new awareness of his relatedness to man and the universe
is not subject to statistical study and so is omitted
from the evaluation.
"
Rather than use this simplistic test proposed
by the Chief Justice, I shall set forth the officially
declared goals and purposes of the program and then
utilizing available information, show to what degree
the program has been able to reliably measure its
accomplishments and, using criteria other than recividism,
will attempt to show more reliably the true effect of
the program. In that many of the questions raised by
11 -

the Chief Justice touch upon the declared goals and
purposes, I shall examine the questions and answers
to ascertain to what degree his answers are supported
by fact,
A few years ago when legal Commentors were scrutinizing
the then infant pretrial diversion programs, they
29
foresaw constitutional infirmities, and it will be
a purpose of this paper to analyze the New Jersey
procedures to determine to what degree, if any, they
might infringe on individual rights granted by the
Constitution.
C, Other Terms Defined
There are a number of other terms associated with




Participant - A defendant who has been removed
from the ordinary course of prosecution in accordance
with New Jersey Court Rule },: 28
(2) Rejection - Denial of entry into a pretrial inter-
vention program or voluntary choice not to seek
entry.
(3) Termination - Involuntary return of a participant
to ordinary prosecution.
(ij.) Dismissal - Dismissal of charges against a participant
after successful program completion.
- 12 -

II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
IN NEW JERSEY
In order to fully appreciate the significance
of the Pretrial Diversion program in New Jersey, it is
necessary to first understand the manner in which
offenses are dilineated, the structure of the court
system and the alternative means of diversion available.
It is therefore my intent at th<6s point to briefly
set forth this information in order to provide readers
with facts that will assist them in evaluating the PTI
program in New Jersey.
A. Type Offense
Although the terra "felony" is commonly used in
criminal law literature and practice in New Jersey,
in fact, New Jersey does not have a class of offenses
called felonies.
3/
The statutes provide that:
"Assaults, batteries, false imprisonments, affrays,
riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, nuisances,
cheats, deceits, and all other offenses of an
indictable nature at common law, and not otherwise
expressly provided for by statutes are misdemeanors.
The penalty for a misdemeanor is, unless otherwise
provided by law, a fine of not more than $1000.00 or
imprisonment for not more than three years or both.
High misdemeanors are specifically designated as
such by statute, and the penalty for a high misdemeanor
includes, unless otherwise provided, a fine of not
13





The Disorderly Persons Law sets out a listing of all
the criminal offenses falling below the severity level
of misdemeanors. It limits the punishment for such
offenses to imprisonment in the county workhouse,
penitentiary or jail for not more than 6 months, or a
fine of not more than $500.00 or both, except as otherwise
35
provided.
In New Jersey, an individual may not be held to
answer for a criminal charge unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases that were
36
not prosecuted upon indictment at common law. High
misdemeanors and virtually all misdemeanors are within
37
the constitutional guarantee of an indictment. This
constitutional right to an indictment is solely for common
law crimes, and the touchstone for determining whether
an indictment is or is not constitutionally requisite
is whether. the offense was an offense requiring an
38
indictment at common law. Disorderly Persons offenses
belong to a category of common law "minor offenses"
39
which were not in their nature indictable.
B. Court Structure and Procedure
The trial court structure in New Jersey includes
the Superior Court, (Law Division, ) the County Courts,
the County District Courts and the Municipal Courts.
- Mi -

The Superior Court, ( Law Division) has general criminal
jurisdiction throughout the state while the Law Division
of the County Courts has criminal jurisdiction for
matters occurring within the county. As a practical
matter the majority of the criminal work is handled
by County Court Judges. The County District Courts and
the Municipal Courts have concurrent criminal and
quasi criminal jurisdiction over ordinance violations,
disorderly persons violations and other specified crimes
and offenses, including some crimes where indictment and
trial by jury can be waived.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has declared
that one of the principal aims of the Court is to achieve
complete unification of the state court system, and with
the aid of a $9^,000.00 SLEPA erant, the Administrative
Office of the Courts has undertaken the development of
a comprehensive plan that will eventually be submitted
to the Governor and the Legislature. To say the least,
at the present time the overlapping jurisdictions of the
different courts is confusing, and in an effort to
dispell some of this confusion I will briefly trace
the route of a typical criminal prosecution, through
the criminal justice system.
If an individual commits an assault, he could be
arrested without a warrant and be brought before a
committing judge where a complaint must be filed and
a warrant could be obtained. If the person taking the
- 15 -

complaint feels that no warrant is necessary, a summons
may be issued instead.
If the offense charged is minor in nature, the
municipal judge may arraign the offender and receive
his plea; however, it is at this first appearance
before the court following the filing of the complaint
that the judge is required to advise the defendant
of the existance of any Pretrial Intervention Program,
kk
and how to enroll in it. It is also at this time,
14-5
that counsel is assigned if appropriate.
If the county has a PTI program for non-indietable
offenses, and the defendant is interested in participating,
he would not be arraigned until he had had the opportunity
to apply for the program. If he is accepted, the case
will be continued to allow participation. If there is
no such program in that county that matter proceeds
to arraignment, plea and trial.
If the complaint charges the defendant with an
indictable offense, the court must inform l^im of his
right to a probable cause hearing, his right to indictment,
his right to trial by jury and whether or not he may
waive indictment and trial by jury. If the county has
an approved pretrial intervention program which handles
indictable offenses, it is at this time that the defendant
must be advised of the program and given the opportunity
to apply. If the offender is enrolled in the program,
his case will be continued.
- 16 -

If an indictment has already issued, the defendant
is not precluded from applying for enrollment in a PTI
program, assuming that it accepts indictable offenders.
The defendant has 25 days after making his original
plea to the indictment in which to file his application
for enrollment.
Thus it can be seen that the pretrial intervention
program is designed to operate in most cases between the
complaint and indictment or arraignment stages of the
proceedings, and in those cases where an indictment is
returned before the offender has the opportunity to
make application, he will be given an opportunity to
enroll.
C. Other Means of Disposition
In addition to Pretrial Intervention and normal
trial, a prosecutor in New Jersey may utilize other
procedures to handle offenders. He is, of course,
at liberty. to continue to use informal agreements
whereby the charges are dropped on the condition that the
alleged offender (l)join the armed services, (2) stay
away from a certain person or area, (3) seek psychiatric
or medical help, (1+) enroll in Alcoholics Anonymous,
or (5) undertake some other action that the prosecutor
desires.
Shortly after Rule 3:28 was initially implemented
-17-

the New Jersey Legislature passed a law enacting a
program for narcotic offenders. This program provides
for either pre-plea or pre-sentencing diversion of
first time drug offenders and for expungement of their
convictions upon successful completion of the program.
Although not technically a diversion program, the
Disorderly Persons Act has provision whereby a convicted
offender may have his record cleared if he remains free
53
of trouble for five years, and there is also a general
provision in the law whereby an offender convicted
of any offense other than treason, misprison of treason,
anarchy, all homicides, assault on a head of state,
kidnapping, rape, arson or robbery, may have the record
of their conviction expunged after 10 years.
Another alternative means of disposition available
to the prosecutor is Plea Bargaining, and this procedure
has received official recognition and sanction in
ss
New Jersey by Court Rule. These agreements can include
provisions whereby certain offenses will be dismissed
or reduced and the prosecutor will recommend a particular
sentence.
From the above brief summary it is readily apparent
that the legislature has not failed to act to give
defendants the opportunity to avoid the stigma associated
with a criminal conviction and that even without a
formal pretrial intervention program, a prosecutor has at
his disposal means of tailoring the severity of the criminal





Ill THE HISTORY OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION IN NEW JERSEY
The first recognizable pretrial diversion type
program to gain national visibility was developed in
56
Flint, Michigan in 1965i however, this project has not
been afforded recognition as the initiator of the present
concept. This distinction has generally been afforded
two more commonly known projects, Project Crosswords,
in Washington, D.C. and the Manna tten Court Employment
Project of the Vera Institute of Justice in New York
57
City. These were funded in 1968 by Department of Labor
Manpower funds.
As a result of the supposed success of these initial
or pilot programs, the U.S. Department of Labor and the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) under-
took the financing of a number of "second round" programs
across the country in 1971. (Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston,
Cleveland, Minneapolis, San Antonio, and the California
Bay Area.) The concept of pretrial diversion has proven
to be a popular one and was quickly endorsed by legal
scholars, courts, legislators, public officials, the
59
American Bar Association, national commissions and others,
but there have been a number of scholars who have begun to
question the validity of the claims of success made
60
by those who support- this new concept.
Such criticism does not seem to have been prevalent
- 20 -

in 1970 when the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked
to promulgate a Court Rule allowing for the development
of the Newark Defendants Employment Project (N.D.E.P.).
6\
Although other states had used prosecutorial discretion
U
and legislative action as the basis for . the development
of their programs, it was felt that due to the ambiguities
about the extent of prosecutorial discretion in New
63
Jersey a court rule was needed.
Rule 3:28 which was then called "Defendants Employ-
ment Programs", because it. was intended to authorize the
development of an employment oriented rehabilitation
program in Newark- similar to the pilot programs, was
enacted in October of 1 97C> -assd This court rule required
approval by the New Jersey Supreme Court of any program
that was developed. Only designated judges were allowed
to rule on requests for admission. Otherwise the initial
rule was similar to the present one in that postponement
was of limited duration, and dismissal could only be
achieved upon the recommendation of the program director
and with the cdnsent of the prosecutor. Termination
followed by normal processing was required for those
for whom such return was recommended by the program
director.
Whatever statistical validity existed to support the
"pilot" and "second round" programs fell by the wayside
in September, 1973 when Rule 3:28 was amended to allow
-Z\-

for programs other than those providing employment
oriented rehabilitation. By the 1973 amendment, the Court
made clear that drug and alcohol detoxification programs,
in particular ,were eligible for approval and could be
operated under the amended rule.
On April 1, 197^ Rule 3:28 was extensively amended
and assumed its present form. It was at this time that
the rule was re-titled "Pretrial Intervention Programs",
66
and existing due process safeguards were incorporated.
In an attempt to insure uniform development of PTI
programs throughout the state, program administration
was required to be placed either under the Trial Court
Administrators or the Chief Probation Officers of the
counties and a coordinating unit was developed in the
Administrative Office of the Courts. The first year of
this unit's life was spent in developing a proposal for
statewide implementation of a uniform program of pretrial
67
intervention. In December of 1 97^4- the Supreme Court
reviewed and approved a plan calling for the establishment,
"oh an operational basis, of a unified, statewide system
68
of PTI programs.
As previously noted, the first operational program
in New Jersey was the Newark Defendants' Employment
Project, but contrary to what the name implies, only
$$% of those taken into the project during the first'
69
four years of its existence were unemployed. In fact,
N.D.E.P. program was multi-problem oriented, and it
- 22 -

was designed to handle defendants charged with any
70
offense. It excluded only those opiate-addicted. By
the end of 1973» N.D.E.P. was making rather startling
claims of success, and was alleging that it had reduced
71
recidivism to 5%« Such claims would not have withstood
a little healthy skepticism and close scrutiny. The
figure was arrived at in the manner discussed below,
and the process is illustrated here so that the reader
may be assisted in evaluating claims of this program
and others in the remainder of the paper.
By the end of 1973 N.D.E.P. h*d considered the
applications of more than 1 500 defendants and had
enrolled 7&0. Note that no mention is made of the
number of offenders who were theoretically eligible
nor are we told how many were discouraged from applying
by the restrictive admissions criteria or by the inter-
viewer's verbal assurance that application for the program
fould be a useless waste of time in light of the offenders
12
record or the nature of the pending charge.
Despite the fact that 7&0 of the actual applicants
were felt to be prime candidates for such rehabilitation,
33% of these subsequently failed to complete the program.
We are not, of course, told what constituted passing
or lailing nor are we told how one determines that an
offender is rehabilitated. The bottom line is, of
course, the 5% figure, but this is $% of those who
successfully completed the program, and even here we
- 23 -

are not given adequate information. 'we are not told
what effort was made by N.D.E.P. to follow each and every
"graduate", nor are we told for how long a period the
"graduates" remained arrest free. This grossly unpro-
fessional flaunting of misleading statistics is not
73
unique to administrators and proponents of PTI programs,
but it is unfortunatly a wide spread and accepted
practice as will later become evident.
The Hudson County Pretrial Intervention Project
was the next program to be established in New Jersev and it
Ik
began operations November 1, 1971. Its director was
Donald Fhelan, who is presently the Director of Pretrial
Services for the Administrative Office of the Courts
for the State of New Jersey. This program was, from
its inception, a broad range program that in theory was
open to anyone over 18. In practice, however, individuals
who had past records or who were charged with crimes of
extreme violence associated with serious injury, crimes
involving the dispensing of significant amounts of drugs,
traffic, health code or gambling violations or those who
had an indictment returned against them stood little
chance of acceptance. Such exclusive criteria, you
would assume, would tend to create a creaming process
whereby the accepted applicants would be "good" criminals,
but the program took this creaming process a step




wherein the participant signed a Participant Agreement,
and, if accepted, was assigned to a counsel-rfor a
seven to eleven week period of informal participation
for evaluation of attitude and motivation. It was
only after this initial screening that the applications
of those remaining were processed. In a.1^ year evaluation
the figures indicate that 1^3,6% of the 868 .actual
participants were rejected during the review period,
18^ were awaiting a decision, 86 remained in the program
at the time of the study, and 21 6 had passed through the
program. We are told that 153 individuals had successfully
completed the program and we are told that only six had
been rearrested, but we are not told how thorough the
follow up was, nor are we told how long these "graduates"
had been on the street. It is interesting to note that
the program estimated that the cost per successful
participant was $1,250.00 although no justification
75
for that figure is provided.
The next significant plateau in the growth of the
concept of PTI was reached when the Supreme Court of
New Jersey decided the case of State v. Leonardis ,
71 NJ85 ,363 A. 2d 32/ . Here the court strongly
suggested that PTI programs should be established in
each county declaring that such programs had proven
their worth by lowering recividism and raising skill
76
levels. Although the court recognized that the goals
-ES-

of PTI programs were two-fold, that (1) rehabilitation
and (2) expeditious ffiopoalag , they stated] "expeditious
disposition is ... subordinate to the rehabilitative
,,77function ... , and that greater emphasis in deciding
who should be admitted "should be placed on the offender
than on the offense."
In this landmark decision the court was faced with
the questions of whether or not the PTI programs could
presumptively exclude individuals charged with certain
offenses. They declared that although no one could be
automatically excluded from participation, the criteria
could be set sufficiently high to assure selection
of those applicants who had the best prospects for
rehabilitation. The court was also asked to decide
to what degree the denial of an applicant's enrollment
request was a matter of unreviewable prosecutorial
discretion. The court, on this issue, decided to limit
the discretion, and set forth standards that would have
to be met by the program staff and by the prosecutors
in reviewing applications. These standards were sub-
sequently published by order of the court as the official
guidelines governing all the New Jersey programs.
By the end of 1975* there were 9 pretrial intervention
plans that had received the approval of the Supreme Court
and were operational. This figure included two separate
programs in both Hudson and Camden Counties. Thus of the

21 counties, only 7 had chosen to implement the program.
Leonardis was undoubtedly intended by the court to prod
the counties into developing pretrial intervention programs,
but the case of State v Kourtski decided October 12, 1976
was the one that firmly declared just how aggressive the
judiciary intended to be in pushing this new reform. In
that case the defendant was being held on charges in Somer-
set County which was one of the counties that had chosen
not to fund a pretrial intervention program, and he asked
to be removed from the trial docket until the county had
an approved program. The defendant's contention was that
Somerset County's failure to develop such a program denied
him equal protection of the law. The trial court declared
that the fact that some counties had programs while others
did not was a wholly arbitrary classification which was
clearly unrelated to the stated purpose of the Court Rule
that established the authority for the programs in New
Jersey. Consequently, it held that the defendant could not
be prosecuted until a pretrial intervention program was
established in that county and he was given the opportunity
to apply for the program.
At the time of this decision, 1£ of the 21 counties
in New Jersey had received Supreme Court approval for pro-
grams, and it was obvious to the other counties that they
could not long ignore the message of this decision.
By the end of 1976, three of the remaining counties
- 21

had recieved Supreme Court approval, and the Monmouth County-
Program received approval in July, 1977. At the end of 1977
neither Sussex or Warren County had established programs,
fit
but they were both in the process of submitting proposals.
It can thus be seen that a program that is ostensibly
discretionary with the individual counties has in effect
been mandated by court decision with the result that in




JET DISCuSSlUN OF GOALS AiiD runruSliS UF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION
The goals of pretrial intervention in New Jersey are
admirable and simple. As previously^these goals are two
83
in number and are, in the order of their declared priority,
rehabilitation and expeditious disposition of criminal cases.
Taking the latter first, let us consider for a moment
some of the elements that underlie these apparently simple
goals.
Expeditious disposition of criminal cases is achieved
according to the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court by " remov(ing) certain accused defendants from the
revolving door corruption and futility of imprisonment
••• ," and thus by " removing such marginal offenders from
further prosecution ( are ) the pressures on the criminal
justice calandars ... relieved and once these less serious
offenders (are) eliminated from trial, the judges and
prosecutors (are) able to devote their attention to import-
QH
ant cases, relating to public security."
Thus there would seem to be two distinct ways in which
disposition is expedited. First of all the participants
case supposedly receives abreviated treatment, and secondly
the processing of the more serious cases may be more ex-
peditiously accomplished.
This theory is apparently based on two assumptions.
First, it assumes that had not this participant been afford-
ed the benefits of pretrial intervention, he would have
been processed through the entire criminal justice system.

This means that having been arrested he would have been
arraigned, tried, found guilty, had a pre-sentence report
drawn up and been sentenced to some form of custodial
or noncustodial supervision.
Soon after the guidelines for the anticipated state-
wide implementation of the pretrial intervention program
were announced, a workshop for individuals who might become
involved in the program was held in Princeton, New Jersey.
The report of the workshop included an important comment
which was:
PTI theory sometimes assumes that a diversion
is an alternative to the imposition of more severe
sanctions, but realistically only a limited number
of accused persons may face the possibility of in-
carceration.
The resources of a system are only saved to the
extent that it can be shown that the participant
would have gone on to impose the costs of trial and
future treatment. Eut perhaps most pretrial eligibles
would not impose these costs significantly. PTI may
be used, most often, as an alternative to dismissal,
fine or a suspended sentence without probation.
Other commentators have likewise noted that in the
case of most pretrial intervention participants, had they
not been diverted, they probably would not have been sen-
tenced to prison, and that i£ is very likely that the
system caseload remains the same, but that one more agency
with its own substantial budget has been added to the pro-
Si*
cessing. Tho available evidence would seem to indicate
that there is a good bit of truth in these comments in
so far as they might be applied to the New Jersey Pre-
trial Intervention Program, for in all the counties review-
8?
ed by this author, there was not one time when the total
number of employees in the criminal justice system had
-So-

been reduced as the result of the implementation of a
88
Pretrial Intervention Program.
Of the 29,8214. active cases pending in the New Jersey Superior
89
courts as of August 31, 1977, 3.3% represented defendants
enrolled in a Pretrial Intervention Program that had been
90
approved under Rule 3:28. If we assume that 30% of all
those who are enrolled in the program at any one time will
91
not successfully complete the program and have their
charges dismissed, we see that 2.3% of the pending active
cases will result in a dismissal because of the pretrial
intervention program.
Between September 1, 1975 and August 31, 1976 the rate
of dismissals among cases disposed of in Superior Court was
92
a twelve year low of 26.3%, and for tho same period during
9,3
the following year the rate jumped to 30.1%. Obviously
the whole difference cannot be attributed to the pretrial
intervention Program for, as noted f during this period only
3.3% percent of the defendants were involved in the pre
trial Intervention Program and only 2.3% would have had their
charges dismissed.
In fact the effectiveness of the pretrial intervention
program must be seriously questioned when one views the
crime statistics for the state over the last 10 years. As
following chart clearly illustrates^ between 1967 and 1975
approximately 1 i|_ to 15 percent of of all those arrested
for Crime Index Offenses were never brought to trial, but
the 1976 figure shows a decrease in this area to 10%.
- 31 -

TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF THOSE
ARRESTED FOR C.I.O. BUT NOT CHARGED
1968" 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 197^ 1975 1976
13 16 15 13 15 17 15 1^ 10
Thus it can be seen that for the same period that
pretrial Intervention Program began to divert a report-
able percentage of cases, the police and prosecutors
were diverting informally a significantly lower percentage
of cases prior to trial. As previously noted, although
Pretrial Intervention Programs have been operating in
New Jersey for almost eight years now, it is only within
the last two years that they have been a significant
96
factor in most counties' and could be expected to have had
cany noticeable effect on the state-wide statistics.
Based on the above figures, it would not seem to
be unfair to suggest that Pretrial Intervention is not
resulting in any significant increase in the total number
of offenders being diverted from the criminal justice
system, but instead it is causing those who would have
been informally diverted to be formally diverted at a later
time.
The second assumption that is inherent in the theory
that Pretrial I ntervention expedites disposition and thus
conserves criminal justice resources is that the treatment
and processing that is afforded the PTI participant is
less in amount and cost than that which would have been




As previously mentioned, there is a strong possibility
that a significant percentage of pretrial intervention
participants would have had their charges dismissed in-
formally under the pre- PTI policies. If we assume that
such is not the case, we must still consider the fact that
historically in New Jersey in excess of Q0% of the
criminal cases tried in Superior Court are disposed of
97
through guilty pleas. Only, 37% of the sentences awarded in
. . 98
County and Superior court result in incarceration find onlv
99
23% result in probation. light of the screening proced-
ures that are applied to all pretrial intervention applic-
ants, it would seem to be a justifiable inferance to say
that few if any pretrial intervention participants would
have been arraigned, plead not guilty, and been incarcerated
or subjected to a probation program involving as much sup-
100
ervison as they receive in the pretrial intervention programs.
In evaluating the relative savings of resources, it
is not only necessary to look at the resources that would
have been expended in processing the participants under
previously normal methods, but it is also necessary to
look at the resources now being devoted to all phases of
the program.
Previously if an individual was of a type who might
be eligible for a reduction in charge, a partial or full
dismissal or other informal diversionary practices, his
counsel would approach the decision maker and propose such
33

a solution; or very possibly the police or prosecutor on
their own would make a conditional offer. The resulting
informal agreement might be to the effect that if the defen-
dant would (1) stay out of trouble, (2) join the armed
forces, (3) seek psychiatric help, (i|) leave town, or any ^
other number of other possible conditions, the charges .
. C
would be reduced or dismissed. If the prosecutor or police
were unwilling to go along with the agreement, then the
defendant proceeded to trial. There was no appeal from
this procedure, and little if any government effort was ex-
pended.
If we assume that approximately 1 5 % of those arrested
are going to be released without an adjudication of guilt,
it would seem that from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, this
was an extremely efficient system. The informality of
this procedure that makes it so efficient is, however,
lot
viewed by many as the principle weakness of the procedure;
and a great deal of debate has gone into the issue of
whether or not vesting such discretionary power in the
police and prosecutors is justified and constitutional.
Pretrial diversion is^as noted^a formalized procedure
which is intended to make this procedure more visible and
consequently, it is assumed, more equitable. Unfortunately,
as is so often the case, such formalization means paper,
people and procedures, and these all cost money.
The Administrative Office of the Courts which is
charged with the responsibility of administering and
-34-

coordinating the pretrial intervention programs throughout
the state has 22 standardized forms that they distribute
to each approved program. Among these are a Notice
of PTI program existance form (english and Spanish),
a referral form with II4. questions, an initial interview
form with 53 questions, a health survey with 59 responses
required and many other detailed reports and forms.
There is simply no way short of counting to determine
|o3
how many local forms are being used.
Every offender must be advised of the existence
ION
of the PTI program, and if he is interested, he will
be referred to an initial interviewer. After a series
of checks are run on the information gathered, his appli-
cation with accompanying paperwork will be forwarded to
the program director for approval, then to the prosecutor
for approval and finally to the judge. If the program
director or the prosecutor does not think diversion
appropriate jbut the offender disagrees, then the court
will hold a hearing to determine if these officials have
abused their discretion by denying enrollment. Should the
defendant disagree with the Court's decision, the
defendant may seek leave to appeal to the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court or even to the State
Supreme Court. In light of the fact that there are
equal protection and due process questions involved,
it is not inconceivable that we will one day see an
appeal relating to pretrial intervention in the Supreme
Court of the Unites States. This entire procedure is
-35-

an additional burden on the criminal justice system
that is not present in an informal diversion program.
Since the New Jersey program is available to all defen-
dants, this would seem to be an excellent opportunity
105
for a defense counsel to exercise dilatory tactics,
if such would be to his clients advantage. What defense
counsel who is representing a first time, minor or
medium severity offender would be representing his
client's interest to the full extent allowable under the
law if he did not try to get that client into a program
whereby the conviction would be avoided? I suggest
that if the stigma of conviction is as real as some
people contend, the answer to that question must be that
every responsible counsel will feel that he must have his client
apply and appeal any denials. There will of course,
106
be monetary considerations and "informal understandings"
that keep applications down, but nonetheless, there have
already been enough appeals for this consideration to
107
have become a real factor.
There are other pretrial activities that consume
time. The initial referral, the interview and the
investigation of each and every applicant imposes a
burden not present under the other system. The super-
vision and counseling of those informally and formally
enrolled consumes a majority of the staffs time. Even
if one postulates that all of the services being provided
to the participants would have been provided as post-
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trial services under the old system, (an assertion that
108
is, as previously noted, extremely questionable) one
must consider the fact that the 2,0% - 50% who are
'
rejected or terminated will end up being processed
through the system and receiving a full post-trial dose
of"rehabilitation. " For those terminated then, this
effort is (to some extent, anyway) redundant.
It is apparent then that the pretrial intervention
concept as practiced in New Jersey has within it
numerous resource consuming elements not present
under the previous informal system. Investigation,
partial delivery of services to individuals eventually
rejected or terminated, and formalized admission,
rejection, termination and dismissal procedures are
just some of the more obvious elements. In evaluating
whether or not the criminal justice system as a whole
is benefited and the disposition of offenders has
been expedited, these elements must be considered.
If pretrial Intervention is to become a viable
alternative, it would seem that it must base its
foundation on firmer ground than resource conservation.
In New Jersey the Supremo Court has declared that the
primary goal of PTI is rehabilitation, and therefore
it is important to review factors affecting this goal.
Probably the first question that must be answered
-37-

here is, 'what constitutes "rehabilitation"?'. Webster
defines the terra as "the action or process of being,.,
rehabilitated: as ...the reestablishraent of the reputation
or standing of a person... or the process of restoring
an individual (as a convict, mental patient or disaster
victim) to a useful and constructive place in society
through some form of vocational, correctional or therapeutic
retraining or through relief, financial aid or other
109
reconstructive measure;"
Accepting this as the commonly understood meaning,
-
it would appear that certain elements are necessary to
achieve rehabilitation. First of all, before a man's
reputation or standing can be re-established, it must
be shown that among those who were aware of his reputation
or standing prior to his transgression, he had a better reputation
or standing than he presently has. I feel that it is
sufficiently well recognized as not to require documen-
tation that in certain segments of society an arrest
and often even a conviction will enhance rather than
diminish an individuals reputation and standing. It
would seem then that for these individuals their reputation
and standing has not suffered and they need not, for
this reason, be "rehabilitated."
The second part of the definition concerns restoring
one to a useful and constructive place in society.
If in this case we use restore to mean re-establish,
it seems obvious that one must previously have held
- 38 -

a useful and constructive place in order to be returned
to that level.
Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey has as one of
its purposes the avoidance of stigma. It thus would
seem to be philosophically in tune with that part of
the definition that concerns the re-establishment
of reputation and standing, at least for those elements
of society where arrest and conviction convey stigma.
It must be recognized that this goal could be, and in
fact is being, more efficiently and ju3t as effectively
accomplished through dismissal. It is doubtful that
in the majority of cases the program is designed to
restore an individual to a useful and constructive place
in society. The term "habilitate" is more in keeping with
the true goals of the program. As originally conceived,
the program was aimed at the unemployed and the under-
110
employed, and the intent was to give them something
which they did not previously have, i.e. meaningful
employment. In order to avoid confusion, throughout
the paper I will continue to use the term "rehabilitate?
but the reader should bear in mind that often "habilitate"
would be more appropriate.
Once we understand what rehabilitation is, how
do we know when an individual has, in fact, been rehab-
ilitated? If we were to use the dictionary definition
it would not be beyond the realm of logic to assume
-3<V

that with careful investigation we could find out what
a man's prior reputation or standing was and take steps
to eradicate any blemishes that might have tarnished
and lowered his reputation and standing. Pretrial
111
intervention would not be necessary to accomplish this.
Likewise, using the true definition, we could ascertain
what his employment or emotional situation was prior
to the offense and give him services or treatment to
restore him to his prior situation.
The problem is that, in fact, the concept of PTI
is not designed to restore an individual to his prior
status, but rather it attempts to change the individual
112
and to give him the tools to achieve a new status, and
it is here that the dilemma arises. How does one determine
when a man has truly, realized that crime doe 3 not pay?
How does one tell when he has achieved social awareness and
respect for the rights of others? How can one be sure
that a man has achieved the self-discipline and pride
necessary to hold a job and advance on the ladder of
success? If the results of the many studies that have
113
been done on probationers and parolees are to be believed,
there simply is no way to make these determinations.
What, then, are we to use to determine when a person
in rehabilitated? The proponents of PTI have devised
11L|.
an extremely simple, albeit irrelevant, indicator.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
has said that the "true test (of the programs effectiveness)
-1,0 -

of course is measured by recidivism, that is, rearrest
after successful program participation," If a program
participant is subsequently arrested does it mean that
at the end of the program he had not re-established his
reputation or standing? Of course not] Does his
subsequent arrest mean that at the end of the program,
he was not restored or elevated to a useful and const-
ructive place in society? Of course notj Likewise,
116
if he is not the one in five who is caught for committing
a crime, does it mean that he has in fact been "rehabili-
tated"?
The truth of the matter is that we do not now have,
nor are we likely to find an accurate means of determining
when a person has been habilitated or rehabilitated and,
if the proponents of PTI and other reform movements
would admit this, they might gain in credibility what
they would loose in self- sanctity.
Once we recognize that pretrial intervention is
not, or at least does not appear to be, cost-effective
in and of itself, and we acknowledge that we do not
pocess the wherewithall to determine if it truly
habilitates or rehabilitates, we are left with the question
of whether or not there is a useful place in the criminal
justice system for this reform.
Crimes and criminals can be regarded as being
involved in a continuum that advances between extremely




persons and property. Traditionally in the United States,
it has been within the police and the prosecutors disc-
retion to give deserving individuals "a break" and not
to charge and prosecute them for the lesser offenses.
There does not seem to be much disagreement even among
the more liberal or pacifist elements of our society,
that those who commit the most serious offenses should
1)8
be prosecuted and punished. It is when operating
within that large grey area between the extremes that
the police and the prosecutors find their judgements
to be questioned, and it is within this area that a
realistic pretrial intervention program can find com-
patibility.
If a first offender commits an offense in the lower
segment of the continuum there is really little, if any,
need for "rehabilitation." The arrest and threat of
prosecution will undoubtedly have some effect on the
individual, and assuming that restitution or satisfaction
can be given to any victim involved, society would not
seem endangered by dismissing this individual without
submitting him to a formalized PTI type program or
criminal prosecution. If the avoidance of stigma is
in
a legitimate aim of a criminal justice system, it does
not seem- inappropriate to allow offenders in this area
to enjoy that benefit.
On the other hand, if the offender has previously
failed to respond to such lenient treatment, or if there
-Hlr

has been a serious crime committed which evidences a need
for extensive rehabilitative or habilitative services,
the limited scope of PTI will not satisfy the requirements,
and society would not gain the protective benefits from
its criminal justice system that are usually regarded as
the prime objective of the system. The stigma associated
with this type offense is part of the punishment and
120
should not be eliminated.
To provide pretrial intervention services to those
within the lower group would be wasteful, for the group
needing rehabilitation the least would recieve unneeded
services; however, if we are to use recidivism as our
evaluator, it would seem likely that a pretrial intervention
program for this category would prove an unmitigated
success.
To provide PTI services to the upper group would
be to provide an ineffective service to the group that
needs help the most, and if we were to use recidivism
as our evaluator, there is little doubt that the program
would be classified a gr oss failure.
If pretrial intervention is to be effective
?
it
must operate above the level where stigma and harm are limit-
ed in -quantity but below the level where realistic
appraisal indicates that society's interests in security
will not be satisfied.
Pretrial Intervention can serve as another alter-
native to prosecution in that it allows a degree of
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continuing supervision over those who previously had
to be let go or prosecuted. Under a realistic pretrial
intervention program, the prosecutor has a third choice,
for he can retain control over the offender without
jeopardizing his case for a longer period in order
to enable him to make a more informed judgement as to




The concept of pretrial diversion has emerged
within recent years as a major issue in the ongoing
debate over solutions to one of our most perplexing
social problems, the soaring crime rate. The
promise of a more humane system of criminal justice
to solve this problem has given added impetus to
diversion's popularity.
Amidst a flurry of recent studies indicating
diversion can be successful in reducing recividism,
scant attention has been given to its legality.
Traditional principles concerning judicial super-
vision, assistance of counsel, the right to a
speedy trial, and the privilege against self-
incrimination which inhere in the regular criminal
process, have been glossed over in the haste
to implement a promising new concept. '*
A, General Comments
These comments, when made, were certainly true,
but since that time many of the legal issues inherent
inv pretrial diversion have been analyzed by commentators,
and although the legal periodicals are by no means saturated
with scholarly reviews, there has been enough activity
in this area to illuminate many of the more significant
1*2
issues.
As originally implemented, the New Jersey Defendant's
Employment Programs had many of the equal protection and
due process short-comings recognized by the comentators,
but, as previously noted, on April 1, 1 97U R 3:28 was
extensiveny amended, retitled "Pretrial Intervention
Programs',' and equal protection and due process safeguards
were incorporated.
The enactment of these amendments did not, however,
-MS-

resolve all of the issues. The court rule provided
for procedures to be utilized in "counties where a
pretrial intervention program is approved by the Supreme
Court for operation...", and it did not forbid the
operation of non-approved programs without the protections
afforded by the approved programs. Although this "loophole"
remains, there are no known unapproved programs operating
or planned in New Jersey at this time, and it is doubtful
that the courts would allow a competing informal program
123
to exist.
In August of 1971+9 J» Gordon Zaloom, Esq., Chief,
Pretrial Services, State of New Jersey, Administrative
Office of the Courts, Division of Criminal Practice,
wrote a detailed set of proposed guidelines for the
expected state-wide implementation of pretrial inter-
vention that xiras submitted to the Supreme Court in
124
September of 1971+ . that Mr. Zaloom 1 s article significantly
influenced the guidelines that were eventually accepted
cannot be doubted, for the order adopting and promul-
gating the official guidelines incorporated almost
125
verbatim much of the reasoning contained in that article,
and sections of the proposals have been frequently
126
and favorably referred to by the Supreme Court.
127
In State v Leonardis I . the court set out standards
that were subsequently published by court order in
November of 1976, and these guidelines, as interpreted
by court decisions, when read in conjunction with the
-1+6-

enabling rule, moot many of the issues raised by the
commentators about individual rights under pretrial
diversion programs.
Under the guidelines every defendant who has been
128
accused of any crime is supposedly eligible for admission
into a pretrial intervention program. This policy,
if adhered to, would obviate the need to discuss the
equal protection arguments applicable to programs that
have restrictive requirements, but as later shown, in
practice, many programs in New Jersey appear to have
129
"de facto" restrictions.
Guideline l± specifies that "Enrollment in PTI
programs should be conditioned upon neither informal
admission nor entry of a plea of guilty. ..." and thus
the legality of a requirement that the defendant plead
guilty or informally admit culpability will not be
addressed herein. Suffice it to say, that some programs
in other states have such a requirement while others
do not forbid it, and there seem to be strong arguments
130
available to support such a requirement.
Guideline 5 provides that "No information,....,
obtained as a result of a defendants application to
or participation in a pretrial intervention program
should be used, in any subsequent proceeding, against
his or her advantage. As interpreted by the New Jersey
Courts, this effectuates a strict measure of confidentiality
- k-7 -

and avoids problems raised by some commentators.
Guideline 8 provides that the"decisions and Reasons
therefore made by the designated. .. (decision makers)
in granting or denying. . .applications. .. , in recommending
and ordering termination from the program or dismissal
of charges. . .must be reduced to writing and disclosed
to defendant." Furthermore, this guideline allows the
applicant the opportunity to challenge a decision denying
entry, or a decision to terminate him and have his case
handled in a normal manner. The issues as to whether
or not the defendant must be advised of the basis for
adverse decisions and afforded the opportunity to
contest them at a hearing have been settled; however,
as will be seen later, there remains the question as to
whether or not the procedures provided fully satisfy
due process requirements.
B. Seraration of Powers
Before addressing the legal issues as they relate
to the rights of the individual under PTI, it seems
appropriate to answer two questions raised by the
Chief Justice.
1 . Does the court rule invade the exectutive
authority of the prosecutor-?
In answer to this question the Chief Justice said:
"No - for the Supreme Court has decided the prosecutor




veto power - except o^n cases of arbitrary abuse,"
The truth of this statement is questionable.
First of all the lower courts in New Jersey have decreed
that should a county prosecutor not establish a program,
it would constitute a denial of equal protection for
the defendants charged within the county, and the Supreme
Court has issued an order implementing mandatory guidelines
for all approved programs.
The prosecutor does not have "untrammeled authority"
to restrict his allocation of resources to certain
13$
offenders or certain offenses. He does not have the
authority not to establish a program. He does not
even have the authority to admit participants to his
program, for he must seek an order from the court
granting such admission. Should he desire to deny
admission, he may do so, but his action is subject to
appeal. He may not terminate an unsuccessful participant,
but rather he must ask the court to do so. In fact,
in Leonardis I
>
the court declared that by limiting the
"virtually untrammeled authority" previously exercised
by prosecutors, due process objections to the admissions
137
procedures were met.
Under non - PTI procedures a prosecutor can divert
without giving a written reason and basis therefore.
He can refuse to divert and his decision is virtually
unappealable, or he can proceed with prosecution if the
-H1-

defendant fails to adhere to an arrangement without having
to justify his reasons. Regardless of the standards
used in evaluating the program directors and prosecutors
actions, the mere existence of judicially imposed
procedures and review constitutes an infringement into
the executive domain. Whether or not such infringement
is desirable is not the question. It is in fact an
infringement contrary to the Chief Justice's remarks.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Leonardis X,
the Attorney General filed notices of motions to intervene
asamicus curiae to obtain an extensionbf time in which
to file a petition for clarification and for a stay of
judgement. The court granted the motion on September 8,
1976 allowing for a rehearing to consider the question
of the Court's authority to order diversion of a defendant
into pretrial intervention when and if a prosecutor refused
to consent to diversion. At that time the court directed
the parties to consider whether, in light of the doctrine
of separation of powers, the Court had the power,
either before or after indictment, to divert a defendant
over the prosecutor's objection pursuant to either its
rule-making or adjudicating powers. Briefs were submitted
by the Hudson County Prosecutor, The Public Advocate
and theAttorney General. The Court entertained briefs
fron the Trustees of the Bergen County Bar Association
and Judge Evan Kushner, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
-go-

Court of Paterson, and also allowed the Passaic County
Prosecutor to rely on his brief previously filed.
As to the interpretation of state law and the state
constitution, the State Supreme Court has the absolute
p ower to rule finally, and it is therefore their decision
as to whether or not they have infringed upon the domain
of the Exectutive Branch which is controlling. Since
the earliest days of the state constitution, the Supreme
Court has been involved in an ongoing dispute with the
Legislative Branch over the issue of whether or not
the Supreme Court rule making powers in the area of
practice and procedure are subject to Legislative
control. The full ramifications of this dispute will
be discussed later in that part dealing with Judicial
infringement on legislative prerogatives. It will
suffice to say at this point that the Court has jealously
mo
guarded its rule making power.
The court has declared that PTI is "a procedural
alternative to the traditional system of prosecuting
and incarcerating criminal suspects," and thys is within
the practice and procedure over which their rule-making
power extends.
It is unfortunatly true that "in the long run
there is no guarantee of justice except the personality
m
of the judge," and that "Whoever hath an absolute
authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is
-SI-

he who is truly the lawgiver, and not the person that
m
first spoke or wrote them.
"
One commentator in commenting on the New Jersey
Supreme Courts holding in connection with the leading
case interpreting its rule making powers noted:
"The ambiguous qualities of the expression 'practice
and procedure 1 must be considered. The question of the
proper limits of procedure for rule making purposes
may be baffling, but ordinarily the courts answer is
not finalj if the court answers it unwisely, as by
attempting to manage a subject more suitable for popular
than judicial control, the answer can be corrected by
the legislature. Under the (holding that the rules
are not subject to legislative control) the court's
answer is fraught with larger consequences, for the
court that exercises rule making power and also defines
its limits has declared that its rules cannot be overridden
by legislation. " H&-
It is certainly an arguable point as to whether or
not the judicial branch has the power to establish
"procedural alternatives to the traditional system
of prosecuting offenders," but when they are the sole
judge of the validity of their claim, who can doubt the
answer. Can they also claim that they can "decriminalize
certain offenses," effect police discretion not to charge,
establish "rehabilitative" and social services as
alternatives to traditional prosecution? If they are the
sole judge of whether or not an area falls within their
rule making power, what will become of the supposedly
co-equal branches of the government?
It would seem that the opinion that pretrial inter-
vention as "a procedural alternative ' falls within the
-52.-

practice and procedure over which (the) rule-making
power extends" is based on the assumption that pretrial
intervention has solved many of the procedural problems
facing the judicial system. In support of this view,
the court refers to its prior reliance on an authors law
review comments and its own conclusionary remarks that:
•Pretrial intervention provides one means of addressing
the problems of congestion and backlog of cases which
currentlyconfront our prosecutors, public defenders
and courts. To the extent that a PTI program averts the
costs of processing these cases, it also permits a
more efficient use of the limited resources available
to law enforcement authorities. 1H8
The court gives no basis for these bald conclusions,
and indeed, as previously discussed, logic and statistics
would seem to indicate that in fact PTI is an additional
appendage to the system that simply causes the limited
resources to be spent in a different manner. In 1976 there
IM1
were a total of 335*330 arrests in New Jersey and 27i|, 1 69
of these (82%) resulted in charges. During the same period
there were 2502 people enrolled in Pretrial Intervention
/SI
programs. 20lj.1 of these individuals successfully completed
* lira
the programs. Thus approximately 7/1 0s of one percent of
all those charged with offenses in New Jersey during 1 97&
were handled through Pretrial Intervention Programs. In
light of the fact that these were less serious offenders,
IS3
80% of whom would probably h«ve pleaded guilty, it is
difficult to see haw this program can be said to relieve
congestion and backlog in the courts. Very simply stated ,
there is no basis for the claim that the court is justified
-S3-

in implementing such aprogram because of the effect it
will have on the system.
After the court declared that the program does not
encroach upon the powers delegated to the executive and
legislative branches of the government, the court went on
?
to attemt to explain the reasoning behind this conclusion.
Regarding the executive branch, the court noted that " the
constitutionality of the enabling court rule provides the
essential foundation for mandating judicial review of
tSH
determinations made pursuant to that rule." Up to this
point in the decision, however, the court had only dis-
cussed constitutionality vis a vis the legislative branch.
In essance, what the court was saying was ,f since we can
create the program without infringing on legislative
prerogatives, we can force the prosecutor to participate
in it without encroaching on the executive branch." The
rational behind the courts position is not apparent, and
it is never explained.
^-n Leonardis II the court specifically held that its
"rulemaking power must be held to include the power, to
order diversion of a defendant into PTI where either the
prosecutor or the program director arbitrarily fails to
follw the guidelines in refusing to consent to diversion.
Conversely, where the program director or the prosecutor
would subvert the goals of the program by approving diversion,
ISS
meaningful Judicial review must also be cognizable."
Even if one concedes the point that the court has the

power to establish an alternative to prosecution in order
to avoid congestion and backlog, it does not follow that
they have the power to order the prosecutors to use this
alternative.
At another point in the feeonardis II decision, the court,
once again relying on conclusionarylabels, declares that
the decision to divert a defendant into PTI is functionally
a "quasi- judicial decision" and this leads the court to
proclaim " this conclusion desolves any argument that by
ordering a defendant into PTI a court would be violating
156
the separation of powers doctrine. The courts sole authority
for this position is its similar remarks in the earlier
Leonardis decision, and the reader is left to speculate
as to why the decision is "quasi- judicial" rather than
prosecutorial.
Showing considerable good judgment » the court then
abandons its efforts to justify its actions under its rule-
making powers, and it wisely moves on to consider its
authority for establishing the program under its inherent
adjudicatory -powers. Here the court started off on firmer
ground by citing numerous authorities to support its
position " that the courts have ample authority under their
adjudicatory powers to review prosecutorial decisions
157
where there is a showing of patent or gross abuse." The
court correctly noted that even if a diversion decision
did not entail the exercise of a " quasi- judicial" power,
review would be consistant with the traditional role that




from abusive governmental action.
Unfortunately the court did not remain on this firm
ground, for it returned to discussing "quasi- judicial" pow-
er arguing that to allow a prosecutor to have a pretrial
intervention program that was not controlled by the courts
would be to give the prosecutor more control over offenders
than they had prior to the adoption of pretrial intervent-
ion. The court stated that this would pose the threat of
expanding governmental control over individuals suspected,
but not yet convicted, of committing crimes.
It must be conceded that a program of diversion that
makes the ultimate disposition of the offender depend on
whether or not he will accept specified rehabilitative
services does give the prosecutor „ more formalized control
than he previously had, but unless we are to ignore long-
standing informal diversion programs, we cannot assume that
quantitatively he has acquired more control. The fact that
his control has become more structured and visible could
be an indication that his previously untrammeled discretion
has been restricted and his control over the alleged offender
has been lessened.
If it is a fact that pretrial intervention does result
in "an expansion of governmental controls over individuals
suspected, but not yet convicted, of committing crimes",
is it any less of an expansion because the program was con-
ceived by and is controlled by the judiciary rather than
the prosecutor ? Arguably the possibility of abuse of this

expanded control will be greater when the power is exercised
by the executive branch rather than the judicial branch,
but the amount of the control will remain the same.
Having decided that the establishment of the program
and the supervision of the prosecutor pursuant to Rule 3:28
did not unconstitutionally infringe on the executive domain,
the court went on to discuss the anticipated scope of the
review, and it is here that the court seems to retreat.
Having proclaimed its power to act, it declares its intention
to exercise great restraint.
In the section of the Leonardis II decision discussing
possible infringement by the judiciary upon areas reserved
to the legislature, the court noted:
Equally important, we should not expect the Judiciary
(emphasis added) or the Legislature will engage in a test
on the 15.mits of their power. As Chief Justice Weintraub
noted in Busik v Levine :
A coordinate branch should not invite a test of
strength by proclamation. Our form of government
works best when all branches avoid staking, out
the boundaries that separate their powers. ,d°
In light of a recent lower court decision that had raan-
ifcl
dated the establishment of a program in Somerset County,
this caution by the Supreme could easily have been a warning
to the lower court judges to refrain from taking similar
action. Judicial restraint in this area would undoubtedly
contribute to a more harmonious working relationship with
is
the other branches of the government, for it one thing toA
have the judiciary make available to a coequal branch of
the government an alternate to prosecution, but it is quite




In setting forth the standards to be utilized by the
courts in reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
not to divert an offender, the Supreme Court imposed strict
standards:
While judicial review is consistant with
applicable principles nuder the separation of —
powers doctrine, we are of the opinion that the
scope of such review should be limited. ...
We are mindful of the prosecutors duty to
enforce the law and the Legislature's authority
to proscribe certain conduct and fix penalties for
violations. Accordingly, great deference should be
given to the prosecutors determination not to
consent to diversion. Except where there is such
a showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion
by the prosecutor, the designated judge is
authorized under R 3*28 to postpone proceedings
against a defendant only where the defendant has
been recommended for the program by the program
director - with the consent of the prosecutor. I****-
The court further stated that "the guidelines
promulgated pursuant to (their) decision in Leonardis
were intended to establish a heavy burden which the
defendant must sustain in order to overcome a prosecutorial
veto of his admission to PTI," and that "(a)ccordingly these
guidelines should be interpreted to require that the
defendant clearly and convincingly establish that the
prosecutors refusal to sanction admission into the
program was based on a patent and gross abuse of his
discretion." Finally the court further enhanced the
prosecutors position by stating:
In passing it may be noted that Guideline 3
provides that any defendant charged with a crime
is eligible for enrollment in a PTI program. In
other words, every defendant is entitled to consideration.
-58-

However, the prosecutor's refusal to consent or
the court's denial of a diversion order may, where
appropriate, be based solely on the nature of
the offense charged. ' b4*
It is thus apparent that as to the decision not to
divert, the prosecutor apparently has the same latitude
that he had prior to the enactment of R 3:28. The
court specifically declined to consider what procedures
are necessary when a prosecutor desires to terminate a
defendant's participation in PTI. The argument for
judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to take a
benefit away from a participant would seem to be stronger
than that for the initial decision to grant the benefit,
and these considerations will be covered later in this
paper.
Before leaving this area, it should be noted that
although the court claimed the power to control the
authority to review the prosecutor's decision to admit
participants in order to limit his ability "to subvert
the goals of the program," it did n6t specify the scope
I4.S
of this review^ nor does the decision deal with the
situation .which is far more common than PTI where the
prosecutor declines prosecution.
Although the remarks of the Chief Justice fail to
consider all the aspects of the potential judicial
infringement on prosecutorial discretion, at least as
to the decision not to divert, they would seem to have
a basis in fact.
-51-

2. Is this program compatible with legislative policy?
To this the Chief Justice answered: "It is. The
Legislature in 1971 adopted such policy with regard to
drug offenses and I have no doubt, particulauly in view
of the economic benefit to the taxpayer, would put its
stamp of approval on the whole court policy. The Federal
I fete
Congress is also considering such diversion programs."
At the time of the Chief Justice's speech, pretrial
intervention programs had been operating in New Jersey for
over six years. Certainly, if the legislature was
anxious to "put its stamp of approval" on the program,
they had had ample opportinity to do so. Although
it was true at the time that "the Federal Congress is
considering such pretrial diversion programs, "the same
was true in 1973 when Chief Justice Richard J. Eughes,
(then Chairman, American Bar Association on Correctional
Facilities and Services) advocated the passage of
legislation in the hearings on the federal diversion
|t»8
program. To date there has yet to be a milti-problem
oriented pretrial diversion program initiated by the
federal government. It thus seems somewhat presumptuous
to assume that if given the opportunity the legislature
would "put its stamp of approval" on the New Jersey
program. They have been given the opportunity and they
haven' t.
The Chief Justice's assumption is further weakened
-to-

however, by the fact that on January 31, 1975 the
Prosecutor Discretion Act of 1 97U was introduced into
the legislature, and on January 19, 1978 a revised version
was re-introduced and is presently before the Judicary
It*
Committee. This bill permits the prosecutor to refer
persons charged with certain offenses to a program of
supervisory treatment prior to trial. Under the bill
this power is exclusive to the prosecutor.
Finally, there is presently before the legislature
a resolution which proposes an amendment to the Constitution
to establish the responsibility of the legislature to
no
provide an efficient system of justice, and another
proposing an amendment to the constitution that will cause
the rule making powers of the State Supreme Court to
be subject to the laws enacted by the legislature.
The failure of these amendments and bills to pass
might well indicate that there is insufficient support
to overturn the judiciary's action, but this is a far
cry from the inference made by the Chief Justice. It
has long been recognized that, it is the function of
the legislature to define classes of offenses and to
ill
specify how each class is to be treated, and it has
been stated that ideally the paramount role in the
development of pretrial intervention programs should be
113
assumed by the legislature.
In implementing R 3:28 and the accompanying guidelines
-41-

there can be no doubt that the courts have attempted to
modify the legislatures determination of what constitutes
criminal behavior and how such behavior should be dealt
with. The- court has declared the purpose of pretrial
intervention include: "To provide defendants with
opportunities to avoid prosecution..,, to provide an
alternative to prosecution for defendants who might be
harmed by the imposition of criminal sanctions as
presently administered..., to provide a mechanism for
permitting the least burdensome form of prosecution
possible for defendants charged with"victimless" offenses.
In the text accompanying the guidelines we are
told thafdiversion in appropriate circumstances can
serve as sufficient sanction to deter further criminal
conduct, that the use of PTI provide a mechanism for
minimizing penetration into the criminal process for
broad categories of offenders accused of 'victimless
primes 1 .. .while statutes proscriptive of such behavior
remain in force and that PTI provides for removing
from ordinary prosecution those who can be deterred
from criminal behavior by short term rehabilitative
I7S
work or supervision."
V.'hat does or does not constitute a sufficient
sanction to deter further criminal behavior is in the
first instance up to the legislature, and by long
standing tradition, the prosecutor. If the legislature
-62-

proscribes conduct, and the executive branch desires to
prosecute, it is not within the province of the judicial
branch to provide defendants with opportunities to
avoid prosecution, to provide an alternative to prosecution
for defendants who might be harmed by prosecution or
to de-criminalize certain classes of offenses.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held, however,
that they do not feel themselves bound by legislative
m
inaction, and as evidenced by this program, they have no
hesitancy to fill the legislative void when they deem
it appropriate.
Through the action of the judiciary, the counties
have been required to f&BTA, thorugh the probation
departments, programs -that many of them apparently
did not want. To allow the judicial branch of the
government, which is non-responsive to the electorate,
to develop and fund a state-wide operational program
of this magnitude is at the least poor policy and very
possibly unconstitutional.
In the development of this program no hearings were
conducted wherein opposing views were heard, no consid-
eration of record was given to less onerous alternatives,
nor were the representatives of the people allowed
to decide how best to allocate limited resources. There
is no legislative history to look to in order to ascertain
the intent of the rule, and although we &ve told that
-63-

certain sources were considered in devising the guidelines,
we are cautioned that they were "not necessarily followed"
There are certainly strong arguments that could
be made to the effect that this rule unconsitiutionally
infringes on the executive and legislative branches,
but where would these complaints be heard? Will the
opposing party receive a "fair and impartial" hearing
when the alleged offender sits in judgement? The framers
of the constitution were wise when they adopted the
provisions relating to the separation of powers, and
it is obvious that at the vary least the present
pretrial intervention program in New Jersey unnecessarily
strains this basic concept to the breaking point.
As noted in the preceeding subsection, the Court has
considered the constitutionality of R 3:28 and, not
surprisingly, they found it to be constitutional.
That the Court has the power to make rules concerning
the practice and procedures in all the courts of the
state cannot be doubted. Although the Court declared
soon after its creation that its rule-making power in
the area of practice and procedure was not subject to
(81
legislative control, certain commentators and judges
have fouE^. fault with the authoriries the court used to
l82
support its determination. This author is of the opinion
that the State Constitution makes the rule-making power
as it relates to practice and procedure subject to
legislative control; however, this issue is not relevant
-4H-

here fop there is no conflicting legislation.
The question is whether or not the courts determination
that they have the power to devise afcd implement proced-
ural alternatives to the traditional system of prosecuting
and incarcerating criminals is valid. They attempt to
base this power on the fact that pretrial intervention
solves many of the procedural problems facing the
ifjudicial system, and thus
Afalls within their power to
regulate practice and procedure; however^ their conclusion,
as previously shown, has no factual support.
The Court argues that inherent in the judicial
power iS the judiciary's authority to fashion remedies
(83
once its jurisdiction is invoked, but it fails to. deal
with the problem presented by the fact that it is usually
felt that the mere charging of an individual through a
complaint and sumraones is not thought to invoke the
I8H
jurisdiction of the court. The court apparently rec-
ognized this distinction when it directed the parties
to consider, in light of the separation of powers
185
doctrine, the- courts power before and after indictment;
however, the court never addressed this issue in its
opinion. The courts decision seems to indicate that
its powers before and after indictment are the same.
It is one thing to say that once a court has
jurisdiction and has made its findings, it may form
an appropriate remedy, and it is an entirely different
thing to say that once the legislature has proclaimed
-45-

certain activity to be criminal, the courts can create
alternatives to prosecution, provide opportunities
for defendants to avoid prosecution or Gas simply de-
criminalize what it believes to be victimless crimes.
Although at times the Court attempts to strike a
conciliatory tone, there can be no mistaking the fact ..
that they believe that the legislature does not have the
poster to do away with the court administered Pretrial
Intervention. Regardless of what one might feel about
the validity of the courts position, it must be remembered
that it is they themselves who are the final judges of
its correctness. The likelihood that the scope ar the
nature of the pretrial intervention program in New
Jersey will be substantially effected by other than
court rule is remote indeed.
C. Individual Rights
There are numerous individual constitutional rights
that are effected by the New Jersey Pretrial Intervention
Program. These include equal protection, due process,
speedy trial, right to confront witness, right to a
probable cause hearing and right to effective assistance
of counsel. A discussion of the interrelationship of




There are two areas that will frequently

raise equal protection questions in a program similar
to New Jersey's, They are:(1)Since the enabling rule
applies throughout the state, must a county implement
a program in order to avoid denying offenders within
its jurisdiction equal protection, and (2) must a program
developed within a county be multi-purpose oriented, or
may the program restrict its efforts to offenders in
certain problem areas?
In addressing both of these questions, it is necessary
to apply the correct criteria. If there were a suspect
classification based on wealth, religion, race or sex,
ififc
the state would have to show a compelling state interest ,
but if no suspect classification is involved, the state
need only show that although the program might discriminate
against persons similarly situated, it is rationally
J87
related to a legitimate state interest.
Although some of the early programs excluded female
offenders, none now do, and it would thus appear that
no suspect classification is involved.
In connection with the first question, it must be
noted that the rule merely permits the establishment
of a program, and it does not require such action. One
188
commentator referring to a Supreme Court decision
wherein the Court upheld varying county criminal procedures
ft
on the groutd that these procedures were discretionary
with the counties, submitted that a county* s failure
to adopt a program under the New Jersey rule wwld not
-4,7-

constitute a denial of equal protection. The previously
Ho
referred to Superior Court decision of State v Kourtski
.
and the passage of time which has seen the development
of programs in all counties would seem to have made this
question only of academic interest. The programs, as
will be shown, are not identical ,but the rationale of
Salsburfi would seem to avoid any problems. The correctness
of the Kour^ski decision will not be addressed herein.
This leaves unresolved the other facet of the
equal protection issue, that being, must a program
developed within a county be multi-purpose oriented,
or may the program restrict its efforts to certain
problem areas and thus make ineligible certain offenders.
The official guidelines provide that "every defendant
who has been accused of any crime shall be eligible
for admission into a PTI program," and Guideline 2
states:
"Eligibility for PTI is broad enough to include all
defendants who demonstrate sufficient effort to
effect necessary behavioral change and show that
future criminal behavior will not occur. Any
defendant accused of crime shall be eligible for
admission into a PTI program. \Ihen the application
indicates factors which would ordinarily lead to
exclusion under the guidelines established herein-
after, the applicant nevertheless shall have the
opportunity to present to the program director,
and through him to the prosecutor, any facts or
materials demonstrating his amenability to the
rehabilitative process, showing compelling reasons
justifying his admission, and establishing that a
decision against enrollment would be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
Guideline 3 sets out certain factors which must
-&8~

be considered along with other relevant circumstances.
It declares that pretrial intervention is not ordinarily
appropriate for juveniles, should not be afforded to
those residing at such a distance as to preclude effective
service delivery, and is limited to persons charged with
113
criminal or penal offenses in New Jersey Courts. It
specifies that defendants who are charged with offenses
likely to result in suspended sentences without probation
or fine should not be eligible and specifically prohibits
the enrollment of those charged with ordinance, health
code and other similar violations. The program is not
limited to first offenders, but if a defendants record
includes one or more convictions of a serious nature,
he should be excluded. Even if a defendant at the time
of application is on parole or probation or even if
he is a former graduate of a PTI program it is possible
for him to be enrolled, although special considerations
are appropriate.
The guideline reiterates that any defendant is
eligible, but the nature of the crime is a factor to
be considered. "If the crime was (1 ) part of organized
criminal activity; or (2) part of a continuing criminal
business or enterprise; or (3) deliberatly committed
with violence or threat of violence against another person;
or (I|.) a breach of the public trust where admission
to a PTI program would deprecate the seriousness of
-6<t-

... (the) crime" the application should be denied
although the defendant may present facts or materials
191+
warranting his admission.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has declared that it ,
is the offender and not the offense that must be con-
195
sidered.
Despite this appearance of uniformity, as of
October 1, 1977* of the 22 programs approved by the New
Jersey Supreme Court (7 of which had been approved since
the issuance of the guidelines) only one, the Morris
County Program was open to all offenses. Four programs
admitted indictable and non- indictable offenses, but
196
not drug offenders; thirteen programs admitted indictable
197
offenses only; two programs admitted indictables and
198
drug offenders but not non- indictables; one program
199
admitted CDS indictable only; one program admitted CDS
200
non- indie table only; and one program was solely for
201
alcohol dependant non-indictables.
It is obvious then that the programs do restrict
based on offense, and that by approving such programs
the New Jersey Supreme Court is failing to follow its
202
own guidelines.
The equal protection guarantees of the federal
constitution do not require identical treatment for all
203
offenders. If the distinction among classes similarly
situated is not an interference with a non fundamental
-70-

right and does not result in suspect classification,
there need only be shown a rational state interest.
Economic and/or administrative unfeasibility would,
in all probability, be a reasonable basis for restricting
the program. If a county after having considered the
nature of its problems and the availability of resources
to meet these problems determined that in order to
expend these resources in the most effective manner
it must limit its efforts to certain areas, it would not
run afoul of equal protection guarantees.
The PTI program, as designed, does not seem to
violate existing equal protection guarantees, and like-
wise, if it were redesigned to allow for variations
among counties it would be constitutional. The present
procedure of declaring a uniform policy applicable
throughout the state and then approving programs which
discriminate against offenders similarly situated
violates equal protection guarantees.
At least in theory under the present rule, counties
are given discretion as to whether or not to establish
Dpograms, but under the guidelines the counties with
approved programs must apply the enumerated standards.
Although the term guideline would seem to indicate
merely a suggested procedure, the language of the guide-
lines relating to eligibility is couched in mandatory
terms. (Every defendant who has been accused of any
-71-

jrime shall be eligible for admission to a PTI program).
Che court decisions certainly leave little doubt that the
guidelines must be adhered to.
One commentator has noted:
9
"... While absolute territorial uniformity is
not a constitutional requisite under the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments^ there must be some reason-
able basis for the lack of uniformity which results
in unequal treatment of persons similarly situated
in different parts of the territory or jurisdiction. ij-
The fact that pretrial intervention may be experi-
mental is not sufficient reason for the different
treatment, for the jurisdiction, having once
created the program, must apply it to all persons
within the class who are similarly situated, absent
an economic or administrative justification " for
unequal applicibility.5
3. Salsburg v Maryland , 3ij.6 U.S. SkS (1951*-)
k» Shapiro v Thompson , 39lj- U.S. 618 (1969). "We
recognize that a State ... may legitimately attempt
to limit its expenditures, whether for public -
assistance, public education or any other program.
But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by
invidious distinction between classes of its cit-
izens." 39if U.S. at 62i|
5. See, Griffin v . Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, reh. den .
351 U.S. 95t> (1956) where a full direct appellate
review could only be had by furnishing the Appellate
Court a bill of exceptions, which often required
a transcript which had to be purchased and which
therefore denied indigents access to the Appellate
Court. In holding this provision unconstitutional,
the Court opined that while a state is not required
by the Constitution to provide a right to appeal,
having once done so as a matter of right and not
discretion, it then must do so in a way that does
not discriminate egainst some convicted defendants.
Y/hile a pretrial intervention program which has
limited applicability in a particular geographical
unit does not create a discriminatory classification
based upon wealth as in Griffin , for which a
compelling state interest in maintaining the
classification must be shown, a discriminatory
classification nevertheless is created by the
-72.-

limited applicability of the program. The principle
announced in Griffin that once a jurisdiction has
given its citizens a right, it must be allowed
to be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner
would seemingly compel the jurisdiction to demon-
strate that there is a reasonable basis for the dis-
criminating classifications caused by limited applic-
ability. 2ofc
The official guidelines should be changed to clearly
state that eligibility is a matter for each county to
decide based on its available economic and administrative
considerations.
2. Speedy Trial
Under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment, an in-
dividual has the right to a speedy trial. The Fourteenth
Amendment makes this safeguard applicable to the states.
In New Jersey the state constitution likewise guarantees
this right.
Although under the federal law the defendant need
not demand trial in order to effectuate his right, his
failure to do so is one of the factors that will be con-
sidered by the court in determining if the accused's
Zo8
rights have been violated.
Thus, under the federal law there need not be an
affirmative showing that the accused has waived his right
to a speedy trial, and his mere participation in a PTI
program without demanding trial would very likely be
regarded as a waiver. In Now Jersey the rule is similar,-
for although in State v Davis the court held that the
government must show affirmative evedence of a waiver
-73-

and that the mere acquiesence of the defendant was insuffic-
ient, later cases have held that the defendant must object
in some fashion or his failure to object will be weighed
heavily against him should he make a motion to dismiss
210
for lack of speedy trial.
In setting forth the procedures to be utilized
by the lower courts in administering the PTI programs,
R 3 J 28 provides in purtinent part that " where a defendant
••• has been accepted by the program, the designated judge
may ... with the consent of the ... defendant, postpone
all further proceedings against said defendant ... for
a period not to exceed three months". If further post-
ponement is deemed necessary, it likewise may only be
granted with the consent of the defendant. The standard
application form issued by the Administrative Office of
the Courts to the counties for their use includes a par-
agraph wherein the defendant voluntarily consents to the
government's motion for a continuance and waives his
right to a speedy trial.
It is therefore obvious that in order to participate
in a Pretrial Intervention Program in New Jersey, the
211
defendant must waive his or her right to a speedy trial.
Is such a required waiver con3titutionaly permissible
-7M-

and if it is, what procedural protections are necessary
and or appropriate?
Although there does not seem to be any case law
directly on point, it would seem that imposing a; requirement
of a- waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy
trial is permissible. Pretrial Intervention is a form
of formalized plea bargaining and the Supreme Court has
recognized that a plea of guilty which was allegedly made
solely for the reason that the defendant desired to avoid
a possible death penalty was not compelled in violation
212
of the Fifth Amendment. This decision was subsequantly
213
affirmed in another case where a plea a guilty to second
degree murder was determined not to be improperly compelled
despite the accused protestations of innocence and
wherein the court noted the appropriate test to be:
"The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among




That he would not have pleaded except for the
opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not
necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty
was not the product of free and rational choice,
especially where the defendant was represented
by competant counsel whose advice was that the plea
would be to the defendant's advantage. "21 14.
If an individual may plead guilty to an offense
in order to avoid prosecution on a more serious offense,
a fortiori, he can agree to a temporary postponement
of prosecution in order to achieve a greater benefit.
(i.e. total avoidance of criminal liability)
- 75 -

In order to make such a waiver truly voluntary
it must be intentional and informed. An individual is
permitted to waive the right to remain silent, the right
217
to counsel and the right to be free from unreasonable
2/3
searches and seizures without appearing before a judge in
a hearing. These waivers potentially may have a far
greater adverse effect on a defendant than the speedy-
trial waiver necessary to enter a pretrial intervention
program. Consequently there would not seem to be any
justification for requiring a defendant to appear before
an impartial official in order to effectuate a valid
21*1
waiver. If a defendant is advised in understandable
terms what the advantages and consequences of his waiver
are, and is afforded the opportunity to consult with
220
counsel and to discover the evidence against him, his
resulting waiver (assuming him to be competent) would
undoubtedly be deemed intentional, intelligent and
voluntary.
From a practical viewpoint, the necessity of a hearing
to determine voluntariness of a waiver would lessen
some of the supposed advantages of PTI, those being
expeditious disposition and conservation of criminal
justice resources.
3. Right to Counsel
There has been considerable debate as to
whether or not an individual has a right to the assistance
of counsel in connection with his participation in a
-7b-

pretrial intervention program, and at what time this
right, if it exists, attaches.
Guideline 6 provides:
"Application for PTI should be made as soon as
possible after commencement of proceedings, but,
in an indictable offense, not later than 25 days
after the original plea to the indictment."
In the comment accompanying this rule, it is
explained that the purpose for it is that "cutting off
applications at 25 days after the holding of the arr-
aignment permits defendants sufficient time to explore
with counsel the risk of conviction ... so as to be able
to make the most intelligent and voluntary choice to
seek PTI enrollment. In making such a decision, defendants
have an opportunity under New Jersey's liberal discovery
rules to make an effective evaluation of risk, and an opp-
ortunity to challenge law enforcement conduct through
zzx
motions to supress."
In practice, defendants are advised, "You may and
should talk with your lawyer before signing this app-
lication and agreement. If you do not have a lawyer, ask
223
the Court Liaison to help you arrange for one." An
individual thus has the right to consult with counsel
prior to enrollment, is encouraged , to consult with
counsel, and if he desires counsel but cannot afford it,
he is provided with counsel. In practice, the programs
investigated have established a working relationship
with the local offices of the Public Defender that ensures
-77-

that those desiring counsel receive it.
Once an individual is enrolled and his or her per-
formance or progress in unsatisfactory, they may be
terminated. In the letter advising the participant
of a pending consideration to recommend to the court
22H
termination, the participant is advised that he may bring
counsel to a meeting with the program staff to contest
this decision, and in the termination notice sent by the
225
court the participant is likewise advised of his right
to counsel should he desire to contest the termination.
It is thus apparent that in theory and in practice
in New Jersey, the prospective participant and the
participant are afforded counsel at every critical stage
of the program.
Ij.. Due Process
A great deal of effort has been expended in
New Jersey to insure that due process requirements are
met. Guideline 8 is the principal safeguard^ and it
provides:
..
"The decisions and reasons therefor made by the
designated judges (or Assignment Judges), prosecutors
and program directors in granting or denying def-
endants' applications for PTI enrollment, in rec-
ommending and ordering termination from the program
or dismissal of charges, an all cases must be reduced
to writing and disclosed to the defendant.
A defendant may be accepted into a PTI program
by the designated judge (or the Assignment Judge) on
recommandation of the program director, and with the
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant,
Applications which are recommended for enrollment
by the program director and consented to by the pro-
secutor must be presented to the designated judge
(or Assignment Judge) authorized to enter orders.
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If a defendant desires to challenge the decision
of a program director not to recommend enrollment
or of a prosecutor refusing to consent to enrollment
into a PTI program, a motion must be filed before
the designated judge (or the Assignment Judge)
authorized to enter orders under R 3:28. The
challenge is to be based on alleged arbitrary or
capricious action, and the defendant has the burden
of showing that the program director or prosecutor
abused his discretion in processing the application.
No direct appeal can be filed to the Appellate
Division challenging the actions of the program
director or the prosecutor. However, the decision
of the program director or prosecutor may be challenged
at a hearing on defendant's motion before the designated
judge (or Assignment Judge) and, thereafter, defendant
or prosecutor can seek leave to appeal from the court's
decision denying or permitting enrollment.
A defendant shall also be entitled to a hearing
challenging a program director or prosecutor's
recommandation (following an initial or subsequent
adjournment under rule 3:28) that the prosecution
of defendant proceed in the normal course. The
decision of the court shall be appealable by the
defendant or the prosecutor as in the case of any
interlocutory order.
"When an application indicates factors which would
ordinarily lead to exclusion ... the applicant nevertheless
shall have the opportunity to present to the program
director, and through him, to the prosecutor, any facts
or materials ... showing compelling reasons ... establishing
that o decision against enrollment would be arbitrary
and unreasonable." If the nature of the crime is such
that it would generally cause the application to be
rejected; the defendant may once again attempt to avoid
such rejection, but again the standard of "arbitrary and
227
unreasonable "applies.
In order to evaluate the operative effects of the
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due process safeguards, it is then necessary to look at how
the courts have interpreted the words "arbitrary and
unreasonable" and to consider how the defendant might
go about proving that his exclusion was the result of
an arbitrary and unreasonable decision.
There are then two points within the program at
which due process considerations become applicable.
The initial decision to enroll or not to enroll, and a
subsequent decision to terminate the participant and
return him to normal processing. In the former it would
appear that the individual is seeking a privilege which
228
he has no vested right to receive while in the latter
he is facing the loss of a conferred benefit.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Leonardis I,
there was some question as to what type of proceeding was
necessary in order to review a prosecutors determination
to deny diversion, but in Leonardis I the court said:
"Although a trial-type proceeding is not
necessary, defendant shall be accorded an informal
hearing before a designated judge for a county at
every stage of a defendants association with a
PTI project at which his admission, rejection or
continuation in the program is put in question.
A disposition is appealable by leave of court as
any interlocutory order. " &3o
As previously noted, the Official Guidelines
subsequently enacted further addressed this issue and
specified the standard that the defendant had to overcome
231
in order to have the decision reversed.
In State v White the court was faced with the
-8o-

question of what rights the defendant was entitled to
at the proscribed informal hearing appealing the denial
of an application. The court held that the defendant
was not entitled to a hearing in which witnesses could
be called to explain the circumstances of the crime
and/or testimony would be offered by an expert concerning
his opinion as to the defendant's suitability for pretrial
intervention. The court stated that its review would
be limited to a review of the record before the program
director and the prosecutor to determine if their action
23*
was arbitrary and capricious.
Leonardis II was decided on May 31, 1977 and as
previously noted, the Court clarified its intention to
impose a heavy burden on the defendant who attempted
to overturn a prosecutors decision not to divert. It
stated that a defendant must clearly and convincingly
establish that the prosecutor's refusal to sanction
admission to the program was based on a papent and gross
abuse of discretion. In discussing the nature of the
hearing to be afforded the defandant the Court cited with
approval the holding in white and reiterated "that
review need not amount to a trial type proceeding, but
should be of an abbreviated and informal nature" and that
"(t)his hearing should not constitute a trial de novo
on the applicant's admissibility, but should be confined
£35'
^° a review of the prosecutors actions."
Although the court restated its prior position

that "a disposition by the trial court is appealable by
leave of court" it also stated:
We intend to continue our supervisory role over the
operation of this program and the legal determinations
of reviewing courts and local officials. We do not
expect, however, that these proceedings will occupy a
significant portion of trial or appellate court time.
By their very nature, the guidelines place primary
responsibility for even handed administration of the
programs in the hands of the prosecutors and program
directors. Judicial review should be available to check
only the most egregious examples of injustice and un-
fairness. " 23*
There could be no doubt after White and Leonardis II
that a defendant who desired to overcome a prosecutors
decision not to divert was faced with an extremely heavy
burden and that his methods of overcoming the burden
were limited.
One method of showing that a prosecutor's or
program director's decision was arbitrary and capricious
would be to show that it was a totally unexplained .
variation from the norm; however, in order to do this
one must be able to ascertain "the norm." Just such a
course was ap^empted in State v Forbes .
Defendant Forbes was originally indicted in August
1976 for conspiracy to commit larceny, larceny and
embezzlement. He applied for an existing PTI program and
was rejected. In anticipation of making a motion for
reconsideration under Guideline 8, the defense counsel
asked the program director for permission to review
all the PTI files. This request was denied and the
defense counsel then served a subpoena duces tecum on the
~%Z-

>rograra director requiring him to testify as to his
reasons for rejection and requiring production of all
records and files concerning applications, processing of
applications, and acceptances and rejections from the
Inception of the local program until that time. The program
iirector refused to honor the subpoena and the court was
sailed upon to decide the issue.
The court rejected the request to call the director
as a witness, claiming that to allow this would be to
allow a trial de novo, and it did not allow the defense
counsel access to the records, claiming that they were
confidential and irrelevant.
Although there is admittedly a degree of subjectivity
involved in the decision to enroll, there are many ob-
jective standards which must ordinarily be met. At the pre-
sent time some programs have completed extensive statistics
and the Administrative Office of the Courts has initiated
action that will provide statistical information showing
the factors present in rejected applicants, successful
participants and terminated individuals. To allow a defendant
to use statistics from a particular program to show that
during the last year all applicants having the same
statistical profile as himself had been enrolled and that
none had been rejected would not constitute an infringe-
ment on the confidentiality requirments of Guideline 5»
and it would give the defendant a reasonable chance to
at least raise an inference that his exclusion was based
-83-

>n objectionable criteria not included in the written
justification.
If a defendant cannot interview or examine a
program director, and cannot present reliable evidence
to show "normal" processing, how is he to show that the
program director's or prosecutors behavior is arbitrary
238
or capricious? Action is not arbitrary or capricious
in and of itself, but only when considered in the light
of a determinable standard. The Courts decision in Forbes
effectively precludes the defendant from showing that
his rejection was an arbitrary and capricious act,
and it thus reduces to a meaningless formality the
supposed due process protection afforded by the review
procedures.
In determining whether or not an individual has
been afforded due process in a procedure that has rejected
his request for the granting of a privilege or benefit
to which he has no vested right, the courts have a long-
standing tradition of finding that little if any due
23T o
process must be afforded. When this is cinsidered
together with the many cases that make the prosecutors
decision to prosecute virtually unreviewable, one must
conclude that tho New Jersey procedures are constitutional.
There still remains the question of what procedures
are required to satisfy due process guarantees when
an individual is terminated. Here, as previously noted, we
are dealing with an entirely different situation than
-8M-

;he decision to divert, because the individual has been
granted a benefit and the government is attempting to
21|/I
;ake that benefit away. Cases dealing with probation
welfare benefits, parole violations and public housing would
seem to be applicable here, and without exception they
would all seem to indicate that a defendant who is to
be terminated must, at a minimum, be advised of the reason
for the proposal to terminate and must be given the opp-
ortunity to be heard and to present material before an
impartial fact-finder to contest the decision to terminate
the benefit.
The New Jersey procedures would seem to satisfy
due process requirements in this area. First and very
possibly foremost, it should be kept in mind that neither
the program director nor the prosecutor has the power
to terminate the participant. The power to terminate
is exclusively a power reserved to the judiciary, and
although the court is required to consider the recommand-
ations of the prosecutor and the program director,
it will decide the matter in the first instance and, it
can be assumed, will exercise its own best judgement.
In Leonardia II the court specifically declined to
consider what procedures are necessary when a defendants
participation in pretrial intervention is terminated,
but the rule itself and the guidelines provide some
ifisigftt as to how the court will decide the issue.
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Rule R 3:28 states that at the end of the initial
period of participation the court may dismiss the complaint
jr extend the period of participation based on the
recommendation of the program director and with the
consent of the prosecutor and the defendant. No written
recommendation is required for these actions, but should
2I4.8
the court desire to terminate the participant it may
only do so on" the written recommendation of the program
2i4.9
director or the prosecutor." Before such a recommendation
is submitted to the judge, a copy of it must be given to
the defendant and his or her attorney and they must be
advised that the judge will afford them the opportunity
250
at a hearing to be heard on the matter.
Guideline 8 further requires that the reasons for
the recommendations must be reduced to writing and dis-
closed to the defendant, but it does not shed any additional
light on the nature of the hearing that must be afforded
the participant. The guidelines dealing with the appeal
of the program directors or prosecutors decision not
to enroll a defendant all provide opportunities for the
defendant to present materials to these decision makers
to show that a determination to refuse participation
would be improper, and it was largely based on these
provisions that the courts have held that the defendant
was not entitled to introduce new material before the
court.
There are no such provisions in the guidelines
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oncerning the recommendation to terminate, and it must
herefore be assumed that the defendant could submit
ds materials for the first time to the Judge at the
ermination hearing.
In practice the defendant is afforded the oppor-
lunity to contest the recommendation for termination
>rior to the time it is made. When consideration is
>eing given to recommending termination, a form letter
.s sent to the participant telling him that "Pretrial
.s considering terminating your participation and returning
2SI
rour case to the Court for trial..." The letter details
;he reasons for the action and advises:
You may still contest this decision by appearing in
>ur office on for a meeting with your counselor
md Pretrial's Program Director. If you intend to appear
rou must call this office three (3) days before that
learing date. Otherwise, PTI will assume you do not
>iish to contest this decision."
The letter also advises the participant to show
she letter to his attorney and that the attorney may
attend the meeting.
After the decision is made to recommend termination
the participant is' so advised, and is advised that he
las the right to contest this recommendation. He is
Dnce again advised of the reasons for the recommendation
25Z.
and of his right to counsel at the hearing.
It is thus apparent that under existing procedures
the defendant is provided with all the required due process




VI. SURVEY OF SELECTED PROGRAMS
In ore'der to evaluate the true effectiveness of
the Pretrial Intervention Programs in New Jersey > it is
necessary to look at how the individual county programs
are operating. At the outset it was obvious that time
would not permit this author to visit each county and
interview those concerned with the programs. After
consulting with the Head of Pretrial Services Division
of the Administrative Office of the Court^it was decided
that a review of the programs in Hudson, Burlington,
Camden and Mercer counties would give a sufficiently
accurate impression of how different programs throughout
the state were functioning.
Hudson county was chosen because of the fact that
Id
it is the o^lest and the second largest program in the
state, and it has attempted evaluations of its effect-
iveness. It was also considered appropriate to look
at the Hudson County program for it includes non-
indictable offenses, whereas the majority of the other
counties do not include defendants charged with these
offenses. The Hudson County program is under the sole
supervision of the Court Administrator.
Burlington County was chosen for it is neither
predominately rural nor a predominately urban county,
and it has a recently created program under the joint
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control of the Court Administrator and the Probation
Department. While the staff of the Hudson county program
consists of 19 individuals, the Burlington county
staff included only 5» and the Burlington County program
is one of the smallest in the state. The Burlington
County PTI program does not take individuals charged
with non- indictable offenses but does take those being
charged with drug offenses under N. J.S.A.2i+:21 -27.
The Camden County program was selected because
it is one of the largest in the state, the county is
predominately urban, the program is under the exclusive
control of the probation office and it handles all
it
offenders. The program is only two years old,andA could
be expected to be in a different stage of development than
the Hudson County program.
Finally, the Mercer County Program was selected
because of its proximity to the state headquarters,
the fact that it is of medium size, and has been
operating for two years longer than the Burlington
County Program, the fact that it is under the exclusive
control of the Court Administrator, and the fact that
it took indictable and non- indictable offenders, but
not those charged with drug offenses under N.J.S.A.
2l|:21-27.
Although other counties representing these same
characteristics could have been found, these were chosen
-Bl-

because of their proximity and the author's contacts
in some of the counties which facilitated the gathering
of information,
A, County Programs
1 • Burlington County
a. General
Burlington County encompasses 81 7 • 6I4. square
miles and in 1976 had an estimated population of 331
>
7kS*
Its estimated density per square mile in 1976 was ij.05.7
and of its 39 incorporated units, none were classified
as urbsn, 10" were classified as urban suburban, 8 were
classified suburban, £ were classified suburban rural,
13 were classified rural and the remainder rural center.
255
b» Initiation of Program
The Burlington County PTI program was
initiated in early 1976 based on the suggestion of a
probation officer. Working together, the Probation
Department, the Criminal Justice Planner, and the Public
Defenders Office jointly developed the program, and
after it was approved by the local courts and the Board
of Freeholders ,it was submitted for Supreme Court approval
in the fall of 1976. The proposal was approved on
December 1, 1 976 ' for an effective operational date of
February 1, 1977, but, in fact, the program did not start
screening applicants until March 7, 1977. The program
256
was initially funded by a 6 month SLEPA grant of $27,800.00





The staff consists of a Director, a Program
Coordinator, three Counselors and one clerk. The Director,
does not actively participate in the functioning of the
program and, in fact, all decision making and coordination
is performed by the Program Coordinator.
The Program Coordinator is an ex-police officer
with 9 years experience as a probation officer. He is
a college graduate with a major in psychology. Tb.e
counselors are all former probation officers with less
than two years experience. One counselor is doing
graduate work in psychology, another is a retired
military enlisted man with extensive in-service law
enforcement experience and the other is a recent college
graduate.
The staff salaries are approximately; Program
Coordinator, $17000.00 per year; Counselors, $9500.00
per, year; and clerk, $7000.00 per year. There are no
investigators or other people assigned to work with the
program and, except as noted below, the staff performs all
interviews, investigations, counseling and associated
functions.
All of these positions are in addition to previously
existing positions in the probation department, and no
agency experienced a cut in personnel or funds as the




On© counselor left the program 6 months after
its inception in order to take a higher paying position
t
with the prosecutors staff.
d. Budget
The current annual budget for the program
is approximately $63,000.00 of which 30% is funded by
a SLEPA grant and the remainder is evenly split between
the county and the state. This funding is expected to
continue for two more years.
With the exception of $1500.00 allotted for phone
service, the entire budget is for salaries.
The space occupied by the program offices, the
furniture and operational administrative needs of the
staff and the other expenses encountered by the program
are absorbed by the Probation Department.
The majority of the cases handled by the program
are referred to other community agencies for evaluation,
treatment and help. The services provided by these
other agencies are not billed back to PTI and consequently
257
there is no way to estimate their cost.
e. Admission Criteria and Procedures
If an individual is not brought before
a judge for a preliminary hearing or otherprocedure,
there is no formalized way in which he is advised of




Although the Supreme Court has declared in its
guidelines that "every defendant who has been accused
258
of any crime shall be eligible',1 (emphasis in original)
the Burlington County Program only enrolls offenders
charged with indictable offenses, and no effort is made
to advise individuals charged with non-indictable or
disorderly persons offenses of the programs availibility.
The basis for this is the belief within the county that
259
the term "crime" does not include these lesser offenses.
The program relies to a considerable extent on
"informal" referrals which occur because of referrals
by counsel, police, friends, or other sources.
Once an individual visits the office, a standard
referral form is completed by the clerk and an appion-
tment with a counselor is scheduled 2 to l\. weeks later.
At the interview with the counselor the defendant
completes the standard interview form plus he answers
additional questions on local forms. At this point
he enters into an informal period of participation
which, on the average, lasts three months.
During the nine months of its existance in 1977
the Burlington County Program had I4.I 2 applicants complete
the referral form, butthis in no way represents the total
number that were interested, for there is an unwritten
policy that certain types of offenders need not apply,
and the clerk, the public defenders office, and area
social services have been encouraged not to refer these
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type offenders or offenders with extensive records or
other disqualifying attributes.
Of the lj.12 that applied, during this informal part-
icipation period 279 were rejected, but many of these
were as a result of their failure to adhere to their
participation agreement rather than the unsatisfactory
nature of their qualifications. 210 of these rejections
were by the Program Coordinator, 1 by the Prosecutor,
and 2 were by the judge. 15 of the individuals rejected
withdrew their request to participate and \\2 had their
offenses downgraded or dismissed and were thus no longer
eligible for participation. It is interesting to note
that neither the prosecutor nor the judge reads the
complete file an the applicant prior to deciding to
260
accept or reject him.
The Burlington County Prosecutor's Office has
established a screening unit which reviews each and every
indictment handed down in the county, and as a result
of this review 52% of the charged offenses are down-
er
graded or dismissed.
In conducting the investigation into the facts
provided by the applicant the State Bureau of Investigation
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation files are checked.
These are by no means inclusive, and if an individual
has been arrested or summoned without being finger-
printed his record will not appear in these files.
Likewise, although some effort is made to check in the

communities in which the applicant has ties, juvenile
records, disorderly persons and ordinance violations
and out of state offenses could very well go undiscovered.
The family and friends of the defendant are contacted-
as is his employer unless he convinces the counselor that
such contact would be unduly harmful.
All applications are personally reviewed by the
Program Coordinator, who then briefs the prosecutor and
the judge. The prosecutor is thought to only refuse to
consent when the nature of the offense is such as" to
make such consent inappropriate. The Program Coordinator
does not allow the prosecutor access to the complete
file because he believes that such would violate the
confidential nature of the information. Consequently,
it seems appropriate to conclude that his refusal to
consent could not be based on a complete review of all
available facts. Although the complete file is available
to the judge ,he does not ordinarily review it, and he
bases his decisions on the recommendation of the Program
Coordinator and the nature of the offense,
f . Operation of Program
This program is multi-problem oriented,
and it directs participants to whatever available community
services will help him to resolve the problems that
led to his arrest. This can include social or welfare
assistance, psychiatric help, drug or alcohol abuse
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counseling or just about any other conceivable service.
The staff to participant ratio is 1 to 10 as compared
t a staff to probation or ratio of about 1 to 190 in the
same county.
The counselor and the participant, after a series
of tests, professional evaluations and interviews, decide
on what program is nocessary to help the participant
and once it is agreed upon, a Participation Agreement
is signed whereby the participant agrees to satisfy
specified requirements. This agreement is forwarded
to the Program Coordinator with all the other information,
and he then makes his recommandation as to whether or
not enrollment is appropriate. The Program Coordinator
admitted that although in some cases supervision is not
needed in order to rehabilitate, nonetheless some
supervision is imposed in order to impress on the
participant the fact that he must earn his dismissal.
During the period of enrollment 7the counselors are
expected to and do maintain constant liason with the
applicants employer, his family, and others who would
know of his behavior, but a second police check is not
run prior to deciding that the individual has successfully
completed the program.
g. Termination
If a man does not complete his infornal
period of participation he will be "rejected," but if
he is accepted into the program and fails to complete
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it he is"terminated." Although under the enabling rule
and the guidelines these are quite differant, the pro-
cedures used in Burlington County to accoraplsih both
are identical.
If consideration is being given to discontinuing
a participant, he is advised in writing of this fact
and is given the opportunity to appear before that
Program Coordinator in order to contest the decision.
If the decision to reject or to recommend termination
is then made, the participant is afforded the oppor-
tunity to resist this disposition in a hearing before
the judge, and it is the judge who will finally decide.
The Program Coordinator stated that counselors
informally warn an individual a number of times before
they recommend that his participation be discontinued
,
and it is thus rare for him not to discontinue an
individual whom the counselor recommends for such
disposition.
As previously noted, there were 222 rejected.
32 of these individuals appealed and none were sub-
sequently enrolled. There were 3 terminations and all
of these were based on the individual fleeing the area,
and, as would be expected, none of these appeared to
contest the decision.
h» Evaluation of Program
There has been no formal or informal study
made to determine the cost of the program or its effectiveness.
- 97 -

No affirmative effort is made to follow graduates due
to a lack of time and people, and there is no established
procedure to insure that PTI is advised of subsequent
arrests of those previously associated with the program.
In short, there is no means to accurately determine
recidimsm or to ascertain whether or not the problems
addressed by the program were truly solved or merely
repressed and subsequently reappeared.
i« Future Plans for the Program
Although the program is assured federal
funding for two more years, the amount is established
and not likely to be increased. The Program Coordinator
feels that at least one additional counselor and
one more clerk are needed, but he does not expect to
get them.
j. Miscellaneous
Based on his long experience as a probation
officer, the Program Coordinator stated that he felt
that none of the offenders being diverted into PTI
would have been sentenced to confinement and that at
least $0% of them would never have gotten into trouble
again. He felt that these would have been some of the
better individuals assigned to any probation officer,
and would have required a minimum of supervision and
attention. In evaluating the benefits of PTI, the
Program Coordinator surmised that there were a couple
that stood out. He conceded that PTI could not be
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shown to have saved either money or time in any individual
case, and he doubted if the few cases being processed
had any significant effect on the courts or the probation
department, but he felt that by avoiding the stigma
of the conviction and by providing for the early delivery
of services to that $0% who might have gotten in trouble







Mercer County encompasses 226 square miles
and in 1976 had an estimated population of 321, 050.
At that time its estimated density pre square mile was
J[,2k5»b. Of its 13 incorporated units, one was
classified as urban center, 6 as suburban, 2 as
suburbam rural, 2 as rural center, and 2 as rural.
Roughly 33% of the population is contained in the
urban center of Trenton, and the population density
263
there is lij.,2ij.3.3 per square mile.
b. Initiation of Program
The program was initiated by its present
coordinator while he was working in the Office of the
Court Administrator of Mercer County. At the time
he was involved in Pretrial Services in general and
261|
the administration of the Court's R.O.R. program
in particular. According to the Program Coordinator,
there was considerable resistance to the PTI concept
from the prosecutor's office, the. police, and the
private bar} however, after the program was approved and
information on it became more widely understood,
this resistance lessened. The program received
approval on March 3> 1975 and screened its first
clients on the same day. Initially 90% of the cost was
funded by S.L.E.P.A. grant and the remaining funding was




At the present time the staff consists
of a Program Director, a Program Coordinator, an
Assistant Program Coordinator, six Counselors ( i.e.
court liasons ), 1 clerk and 2 part time students.
One of the counselors is a former teacher and three
are directly out of college. Information on the others
was not available. The Assistant Coordinator is a
former probation officer and the Coordinator is an
attorney with 12 years of experience as a probation
attorney. It was not possible to ascertain the
salaries of the staff members since the Coordinator
refused to divulge this information and refused to
allow me to talk to his staff. All of the members
of the PTI staff are additional county employees
and no agency of the county or state government
experienced a reduction in personnal or in funding as
a result of the program's creation. There have been
two individuals who have left the staff for better
jobs.
Two of the counselors are CETA employees and their
salaries are not part of the program's budget.
d. Budget
At the end of the first quarter of
1978, the program will no longer be primarily funded
by a S.L.E.P.A. grant, and the funding will become
entirely a county obligation. In the first quarter,
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the budget is $25,000,00 while for the remaining
three quarters the program coordinator is requesting
approximately $172,000.00
The program does purchase some services such as
professional evaluations and professional counseling
from other agencies, but the Coordinator refused to
specify how much of his budget was for salaries, how
much for administration, how much for purchase of
services and how much for other expenses. It was
ascertained that the program does not pay for its
spaces and utilities, and that it does receive other
in kind support at no cost.
There has not been any cost effectiveness study
although they hope to have one in 1978.
e. Admission Procedure and Criteria
Defendants are selected from those
appearing for preliminary arraignment before the
local municipal or county courts. Additional defendants
are selected from cases informally referred by the
prosecutors, public defenders, private attorneys,
police, probation and parole officers and from other
sources. The program has prepared a detailed des-
criptive announcement of the program which it has
distributed throughout the area* .... The increased
awareness of the programs existance and criteria
by
caused by this announcement and the formal requirements
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of notice imposed by Court Rule are the basis for
the majority of referrals to the program.
At the applicants first contact with the PTI
program, an interview is conducted by a counselor
during which the program, the nature of participation
and the defendants obligations are explained. The
necessity of having counsel is explained, and if the
defendant is not represented, he is referred to the
local office of the Public Defender or advised to seek
other counsel.
During the initial interview, the Initial Inter-
view Form is completed, amd if the defendant wishes
to continue to be evaluated for participation, he/she
is advised to sign a Participation Agreement and an Order
of Postponement.
It is at this initial session that the counselor
and the defendant agree tentatively on a regime of
treatment.
Defendants found acceptable at the initial inter-
view are assigned to counselors and participate fully
in the PTI program for a period that is expected to
last up to If weeks, to review motivation and to
develop a plan of counseling.
The Mercer County Program accepts applications
from all offenders and in excess of 50% of its




According to the Program Coordinator, there is
no informal discouragement and all applicants may
apply. By the end of January 1978, 2930 individuals had
been interviewed, 711 were awaiting a decision, 11 89 had
266 267
been rejected, 31 had been terminated, 771 had
268
successfully completed the program and the remaining
228 were still active. Each counselor then, assuming
equal workloads, would have 38 formally enrolled
269
participants and 118 informally enrolled applicants.
It should be noted that although the officially
published and distributed project announcement clearly
states that there is a period of informal particip-
ation, the program coordinator refused to admit that
such a period of informal participation existed. In
light of the high client/staff ratio, it would appear
that whatever supervision and counseling does exist
during this period must, $f necessity, be extremely
limited.
In Mercer County, if a jailed individual is
willing to participate in PTI his release from jail
on his own recognizance will be facilitated.
The information that the applicant puts on the
initial interview form is the primary source of
information other than the police reports of the
incident that are available to the PTI staff.
Although a check is run with the FBI and the SBI
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only those offenses for which the defendant has
previously been printed will appear. No effort is
made to discover a juvenile record nor are area
police and municipal courts checked. The employer
and the family are not consulted,
f. Operation of Program
The program attempts to provide a
multitude of services and docs this primarily by
referring the cases to other in-county agencies.
There are no standards as to how often counselors must
meet with participants, but initially they usually
meet twice a week and subsequently less frequently.
No information was given as to the average legnth
of the sessions or as to their nature.
In deciding whether or not an individual has
successfully completed the program, no checks are
made with the employer or with the individuals family,
no new check is made with area police or courts, and
sr than the common standard of "Did the applicant
cooperate?" there are no specific factors that must
be satisfied.
g.' Termination
In Mercer County it is felt that terminations
will most commonly be predicted upon rearrest and
"failure to cooperate." "Failure to cooperate"
varies from a refusal to continue in a rehabilitative
program to repeated failures to maintain required
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counseling or supervisory contacts with the staff.
In this program there is a distinct difference
between the procedures utilized to"reject" an individual
and those used to "terminate" one.
The rejection occurs prior to enrollment during
the period of supposed informal participation. If
a rejection is anticipated the defendant is so advised,
and he is afforded the opportunity to submit written
information to the Program Coordinator or the prosecutor
contesting the decision. He is not afforded a personal
hearing. He may, of course, appeal the decision to the
Court where it will be reviewed for a gross abuse
of discretion.
A "termination" occurs after enrollment. The
individual is advised in writing that termination is
being considered and of his right to appear before
the Program Coordinator to contest the decision. At
hearing he may be represented by counsel, the evidence
against him will be divulged, he will be afforded the
opportunity to testify and present evidence, and, if
appropriate, to cross examine adverse witnesses. If
the Program Coordinator decides against the participant,
he must give the defendant a written report of the
hearing, the decision reached and the grounds on which
that decision is based.
The participant is advised of his right to a
-lot-

hearing before the designated judge and the rights
at this hearing are similar to those in the prior
hearing.
Before an individual is formally warned of a
pending rejection or termination for failure to cooperate,
he is informally cautioned a number of times by his
counselor. If he continues to be uncooperative,
formal action is initiated.
At least 50% of those formally notified of
pending rejection or termination resist the decision
and appeal.
If a participant is rejected or terminated,
he is returned to normal processing, and no special
effort is made to expedite his case,
h. Evaluation of Program
There has not been any study conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program other than
the statistical records submitted by the coordinator
to the courts. The program coordinator felt that there
was no way to keep track of rates of recividisra,
and no attempt is being made to do so. There are
no records kept that would give a cost per participant.
The program has never been thoroughly evaluated nor
does it have the capability to conduct such an eval-
uation since pertinent records are not being kept,
i. Future Plans for the Program
It is hoped that a full time employment
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counselor can be added and that the staff can be
increased to allow for closer supervision and better
follow up on participants
j. Other Comments
It was felt that most of the PTI part-
icipants would have been put on probation although
some from the municipal level would have been sent
to jail. The coordinator would like to see more effort
at the municipal level in order to divert these
offenders before they move up to more serious crimes.
The Program Coordinator fluctuated in his responses
between guarded and defensive, and he refused to allow
any of his people to talk to me. His remarks could '.
very well indicate how his program should be operating
rather than how it does.
3. Camden County
a. General
Camden County is located immediatly across
the river from center city Philadelphia. It is
222.01 square miles in area and in 1976 had an est-
imated population of \\Qkt^S* The average population
density per square mile within the county was 2,181.5>
however, approximately 20% of the population was
in the 8.68 square miles of Camden City, thus giving
this area a population density of 11,582.14- per square
mile. Of its 37 incorporated units, one was classified
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urban center; 13 were classified urben suburban;




b. Initiation of Program
Initially Camdeir County had two separate
programs. One was a federally funded T.A.S.C.
program and the other was a county funded PTI program.
When the federal grant expired, the two programs
were merged and at the present time there is only
one program in the county. Initially both programs
were approved by the Supreme Court on December 13>
1 97U- and they both commenced operations on January 6,
1975.
An individual within the probation department
originally suggested the programs and members of the
probation department were primarily responsible for
the development and submission of the program proposal.
There was no significant resistance from the pro-
secutors office or any other agency, and the plan
was approved by the Supreme Court without modification.
c. Staff
At the present time the PTI staff is an
integral part of the probation department and the
number on the staff can fluctuate depending on the
needs of other sections of the department. Generally
there are approximately 20 on the PTI staff. They
include the Director, the Coordinator, the Deputy
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Coordinator, a Counselor supervisor, 7 Counselors,
i|. Intake Officers, and ij. Clerks.
The Intake Officers initially interview the
applicants and it is they who devise with the app-
licant an appropriate participation agreement.
All of the supervisory personnal are former
probation officers and all of the Counselors and
Intake Officers have college degrees. Two of the Intake
Officers have graduate degrees in the behavior field.
The salary range for the Counselors and Intake Officers
is $6,000.00 to $1]+, 000. 00 per year.
When the program was set up the Probation
Department reduced the number of Probation Officers
by 2, but no other agency experienced a reduction in
personnel, and no county agency had their funding
reduced as a consequence of the development of this
program within the county.
There has been a considerable staff turnover
and only 2 or 3 of the counselors and Intake Officers
presently with the program were there at its inception.
d. Budget
Figures on the budget were not available,
but it was noted that the budgets of other sections
of the probation department and of other county
agencies had not been reduced because of the PTI
program. The budget for the PTI program is co-mingled
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with the overall probation budget, and the spaces,
utilities and furnishings are provided for by the
probation department.
The PTI program acts primarily as a referral
agency, and the agencies to which PTI refers its'
participants for evaluation and treatment do not
bill back the PTI program for these services.
Although there was a cost effectiveness study
run on the T.A.S.C. program by an independant agency,
none has been run on the PTI program and none is planned.
e. Admission Criteria and Procedures
The program has distributed information
about the program to area attorneys, police and
prosecutors, and it has distributed referral forms to
the municipal courts and others who might have
occassion to refer individuals. These referral forms
are completed by the defendant, his attorney or the
referring individual, but they are not completed by
the PTI -staff.
When an individual appears at the office seeking
admission, it is first determined if he is eligible.
If he is not, he is not allowed to submit an application
and he is simply told that he may not apply.
If the individual is eligible , he is given the
standard state initial interview form with a local
6 page supplement and told to take it home and fill
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it out. Help is provided if necessary, but it is
primarily the applicant's responsibility to complete
this form.
The program does not keep cumulative statistics,
consequently it was not possible to determine the
total referrals since the programs inception, but
during 1977 approximately 1200 referrals were accepted
and all of these were subsequently given an initial
interview.
At the initial interview
T the prospective participant
is given a detailed list of what is expected of him
and he is clearly advised that failure to satisfy
these requirements may or will result in rejection
or termination.
After a defendant applies, there .is a period of
informal participation that varies in legnth; however,
it generally lasts two months. During this period
the individual is investigated and evaluated, and his
motivation is reviewed. Every attempt is made to
involve the applicant in treatment at this stage. At
least 20% of the applicants are found wanting in
motivation during this period and they are terminated.
The fact that a defendant has applied for the
program will have little if any effect on his chance
for bail or R.O.R.
In reviewing the information provided by the
applicant on the initial interview form, only a
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limited check is made to discover a prior criminal record.
The S.B.I, records are checked to determine prior arrests
and convictions^ however, this file only contains a record
of offenses for which the applicant was fingerprinted.
The defendant's home community is checked to dicover any
offenses committed therein, and this check includes a
review of juvenile records for those applicants less than
21. If an applicant lists an out of state address, that
state is checked. An effort is made to determine if there
has been prior PTI participation in Camden County. Employ-
ers and family are contacted if the applicant consents,
f . Operation of Program
Since the separate programs have been
combined, the present Camden County PTI program
is multi- problem oriented and it refers individuals
to whatever services are needed within the county.
Each Counselor has 50 enrolled participants
under their supervision and each Intake Officer has
approximately 90 individuals who are participating
while being considered for enrollment. The Intake
Officers are also responsible for processing all new
applicants and although they are primarily respon-
sible for devising each participants program of
supervision and treatment, others such as the prosecutor,
the judge, and the Counselor have some input into the
planning.
During the initial period of informal participation
-/)3-

each applicant is evaluated and begins his program
of rehabilitation. Supervision during this period
varies according to the particular needs of each
client, but the individual is expected to keep
appointments and actively participate in his assigned
program of treatment.
After an individual i3 accepted
?
he is expected
to see his counselor at least once every two weeks
unless he is undergoing professional treatment or
counseling in which case the supervision by the
staff is indirect. The Counselor has a continuing
responsibility to maintain contact with the participant
and the agency to which he was referred, and the
counselor is expected to visit the participant on
unannounced occassions at home and at work.
There is no set criteria for determining successful
participation. If a participant is making a real
effort to improve his situation by faithfully adhering
to his prescribed program, his charges will be dis-
missed.
In order to ensure uniformity in staff performance,
there is a staff meeting each week, and all acceptances
or rejections are handled by the Coordinator or his
deputy. The Counselor Supervisor works with the
counselors and intake officers on a regular basis,




The Deputy Coordinator estimated that
only about 1/3 of those originally referred to the
program are eventually enrolled. Ke estimated that
as few as 2% of those actually enrolled are terminated.
The most common reason for termination has been re-
arrest and failure to cooperate.
The precedures for rejection in Camden County
are different than those previously discussed. Vftien
an indivisual initially applies for enrollment, he is
given a standard set of terms and conditions. These
tell him in no uncertain terms what is expected of
him and what the consequences will be for his failure
to adhere to these terms and conditions. If an
individual fails to meet these requirements he is
sent a letter of rejection without being given a
hearing.
For those /terminated after enrollment, the same
procedures as previously described for Burlington
County are utilized. The participant is notified in
writing and given a hearing before the Coordinator or
his deputy.
Before official action is taken to reject or
terminate an individual for failure to cooperate, he
is usually cautioned on numerous occassions by his
counselor.
Approximately 20% of those notified of rejection
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subsequently resist this disposition, but between
30% and 50% of those terminated have contested that
action. If an individual is rejected or terminated
no special action is taken to expedite his case. The
case is merely returned to normal processing.
h. Evaluation of Program
At the present time the Coordinator is
doing an evaluation of the program, but no information
as to the scope or results of this evaluation were
available. In light of the fact that cumulative stat-
istics are not kept, the budget is co-mingled with
the general probation budget, and there are no valid
statistics on recividism being kept, it is doubtful
that this evaluation would be of a nature to effect
this author's evaluation of the program.
i. guture Plans for Program
The Deputy Coordinator said that at the
present time there are no plans to significantly
change the size or nature of the program; however,
he awaits with apprehension the outcome of those
cases presently on appeal in New Jersey which seek to
force programs to accept non- iridic table offenders and
disorderly persons offenders. It is felt that if
these type offenses must" be included, the size and





Hudson County encompasses only I46. i|2 square
miles, but in 1976 it had an estimated population of
606,190, thus giving it an estimated population density
per square mile of 13, 058.8. Hudson County has twelve
incorporated subunits, four of which are classified as
urban center and eight of which are classified urban
suburban. Three of its subunits had a population density
exceeding 35*000 persons per square mile,
b. Initiation of Program
The Hudson County PTI program was the first
county wide program in New Jersey and was a direct out-
growth of smaller programs in Newark and Jersey City.
The Hudson County prosecutor and Gordon Zaloom, who was
then the director of the Newark program, worked together
during 1971 to initiate the program. Supreme Court approval
was obtained in November 1971> but it was a few months
before the program became operational, for it was necessary
to obtain funding and hire and train personnel. Although
there was initially some resistance from the public and the
police, the resistance was not organized and it did not
pose a significant problem. The proposal that was submitted
was accepted without change, and the Hudson County program
has in the past and continues to serve as a model for other
programs throughout the state.
-II7-

The Hudson County program was initially funded pri-
marily through a SLEPA grant with some in-kind support
from the county aCd the state.
c. Staff
At the present time there are 19 full-time
people on the payroll. There are also two SETA employees,
and there are two student interns who are serving volun-
tarily while working for their masters degrees in social
work at Columbia. The Probation Department is supposed
to assign three probation officers to the staff, but at
the present time only one is assigned. The program employs
part-time students to assist with clerical functions.
The Director of the program is a woman who started with
the program as an administrative assistant and upon the
departure of the director, was promoted. Prior to joining
the PTI staff she had not acquired any education in either
lew or social sciences. Many of the counselors either
already have or are acquiring degrees in the social sciences.
Although the salary for counselors is only $8200.00 per
year, the program has had a limited turnover and most of
the staff have been with the program for over two years.
Except for the individuals provided by the probation
department, every other staff member is in addition to the
pre-existing staffs within the county and no other county
activity experienced a reduction in personnel as a conse-




At th© present time the PTI budget is app-
roximately $232,000.00 per year; however this does not
in any way, shape or form reflect the true costs of the
program, for the salaries of the student clerical workers,
the SETA employees and the pT^bation officer are not included.
Additionally, the program receives its spaces and utilities
from the county, without cost, and other costs associated
with the program such as office supplies, furnishings and
Travel and training expenses are paid by the county.
Many of the participants are referred by the staff to other
county agencies for assistance and treatment and the cost
of these services is not reflected in the program's budget.
No program or activity within the county has experienced
a reduction in funding as the result of the PTI program,
and there has not yet been any cost-effectiveness study.
e. Admission Criteria and Procedure
The Hudson County PTI program accepts appli-
cations from all offenders, and^due to the age of the program,
the Director felt that it is unlikely that any lawyer in
the county is unaware of the program. Referrals result
principally from the general advisements and the forms
given out by the municipal courts when a non-indictable
offender appears before them. If an individual is indicted^
he receives notice of the program from the judge at his




All Individuals who desire to participate must come in
person to the PTI office. Upon reporting they are given
an extensive interview utilizing the standard state forms
and local forms. The counselor fills out the forms based
on the applicants responses.
Except for a computor check of State Bureau of Invest-
igation and Federal Bureau of Investigation files, no effort
is made to check the accuracy of the information given
unless the counselor suspects deception on a particular
answer.
e
If an applicant is not immediatly rejected, after
the initial interview he goes through a period of evaluation
and participation which lasts six tC eight weeks, and if
he successfully completes this phase of the program, he
is enrolled.
The individuals participation in PTI has little, if
any, effect on his chances for bail or R.O.R. This is
principally because Hudson County has an extremely active
bail program and anyone who would be eligible for PTI
would most likely also be a good candidate for bail or R.O.R,
In 1977 1 ,U-80 applications were received and of these
51+0 were for indictable offenses and 9J4.O were for non-
indictable offenses. Z$\\ of these applicants were enrolled,
821 were rejected and 326 were awaiting acceptance. 61




f. Operation of Program
The Hudson County Program attempts to deal with
all problems that are deemed to be causally connected to
the alleged offense and which can be rectified or improved
in the prescribed period.
The client to counselor ratio fluctuates between
50:1 and 70:1 with 3/5 of the case-load being in the informal
evaluation and participation stages.
The exact program of "treatment" is decided upon by
the counselor after extensive interviews with the applicant.
Before an individual is formally accepted, the "Treatment"
must be approved by the Counselor Supervisor, the Program
Director, and the Judge.
The treatment and supervision an individual receives
does not vary according to whether or not he has been
formally enrolled; however, it will vary with the individuals
needs. No affirmative effort is made to check with employers,
police, family or acquaintances to determine how the
participant is responding to the "treatment."
The Hudson County Program does a great deal of
one-to-one counseling, and it is primarily on this sub-
jective evaluation and the absence of a re-arrest
record that the determination of successful completion
is based.
The staff receives constant supervision and training
through weekly staff meeting and training sessions.
Uniformity of actions is to some extent achieved by having
the final decision on rejections, recommendations for

acceptance and termintaion come from the director.
g. Termination
The principle reason for rejection during
the informal stage and termination during the formal stage
have been poor participation and re-arrest for a serious
crime. The procedures utilized in both situtations are
similar. If an individual does not respond to aounselor
warnings, the counselor submits a memo to the director
recommending rejection or termination. If the director
concurs .the individual is notified of the proposed action
and is given the opportunity to present evidence to avoid
the action. About 10% of the non-indictables proposed
for rejection in the situtation resist the proposal, 5%
of the indictables resist it, and only 2% of all those
recommended for termination resist it.
If an individual is rejected or terminated no special
action is taken in the case, and it is assumed that they are
eventually prosecuted in a normal fashion.
h. Evaluation of Program
The Hudson County Program has made a very real
effort to keep statistics, and they have a research staff
which keeps monthly and annual figures.
Figures provided show that between the inception of the
program in 1972 and December 31, 1978, 6,283 individuals
were interviewed. 1 ,598 had their charges dismissed, 3,297
were rejected, 553 were terminated, and 835 were still
pending or enrolled. Thus, of the people who had been

completely processed by the program, 29% had their
charges dismissed after successfully completing the program,
60.5% were rejected before being enrolled and 10.15%
were terminated after enrollment.
The Hudson County program has attempted to keep
figures reflecting recidivism, but they admit that such
figures are inaccurate and deceptively low. The major
problem with these figures is that they only reflect re-
arrests for in-state offenses which result in fingerprinting.
Thus, re-arrest for the majority of disorderly person
type offenses would not appear. Although it is possible
that out of state offenses might be included, there is no
assurance of this. These figures have, in the past, been
routinely provided by the State Bureau of Investigation
for all prior Hudson County applicants, but recently the
State Bureau of Investigation has discontinued this service
and at the present time no alternative means is available.
Keeping in mind that the figures are overly optomistic,
They show that 16.3% of all applicants have been re-arrested.
This includes 11.07% of those who had their charges dis-
missed, 32% of those terminated and 20.35% of all those
rejected. As optimistic as these figures are, they are
nonetheless much worse than the figures given by the Chief
Justice in his speech to the legislature.
i. Future Plans for the Program
It is not anticipated that there will be any
significant changes in the program in the forseeable
- 123 -

future. At the present time the program employees are not
included within the state civil service program, but there
is a movement afoot to include these employees. The effect
of including these jobs within civil service could be
increased cost and decreased flexibility, but at the present
time it is not possible to accurately predict the actual effect.
j« Other Comments
This program is making a very real attempt
to evaluate it's achievements, but clue to it's limited
research staff and the fact that accurate cost and recidivism
statistics are not available, it is impossible for even this




The New Jersey Pretrial Intervention Program has
grown from a single project primarily devoted to solving
employment related problems of minor offenders to a
state wide system of projects which hope to treat a
multitude of problems. New Jersey has chosen to base
its program on court rule rather than prosecutorial
discretion or legislative enactment, and this has resulted
in some friction between the judiciary and the other
branches of the government. The full magnitude of this
friction has probably not yet been realized, for in the
majority of case 95% of the funding for the projects has
been provided by federal and state agencies. As the
initial grafts expire and the counties are called on to
fund the.se local projects, it can be assumed that certain
counties will feel that their resources can be more pro-
ductively spent in other areas. It remains to be seen
if the judiciary will attempt to order local governments
to fund these programs and what the reaction of the other
branches will be to such an order.
The goals of the New Jersey Pretrial Intervention
Program ims been recognized by the courts as two fold.
In the order of their declared priority they are (1)




It has long been recognized by some commentators
that there are certain constitutional problems inherent
in the procedures associated with pretrial diversion $r
programs. The New Jersey Supreme Court has attempted
to resolve these problems by publishing a court rule
and official guidelines that safeguard the rights of
participants and applicants and which supposedly avoid
unconstitutionally infringing on those areas reserved
to the other branches of government under the separation
of powers doctrine.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
has declared that the true test of the programs effective-
ness is measured in recidivism, that is, re-arrest after
successful program participation. Although some programs
have attempted to show that they have materially reduced
recidivism, there has been no sound statistical basis
for their claims, and it does not appear as though any
program in New Jersey has at the present time the means
of routinely following successful participants to validly
determine a rate of recidivism.
Likewise the Chief Justice has claimed that the
available evidence indicated fche- pretrial intervention
programs save money; however, there is simply no valid
evidence which even remotely supports his comments.
First of all in making this claim the Chief Justice com-
pared the supposed cost of sending a man through a pre-
trial intervention program with the costs of sending
individuals to prison or through a feogram of probation.

Interviews with experienced individuals in the field
indicate that it is extremely doubtful that any pretrial
intervention participant would have been sent to priaon,
and few participants would have received as much super-
vison in a probation program as they receive in PTI.
It is thus readily apparent that the Chief Justice was
attempting to compare costs associated with the handling
of two dissimilar groups. From interviews with program
coordinators^it is rather obvious that in fact there is
no way under the present system $& evaluating the true
costs associated with pretrial intervention, for
many of the costs of the program such as rent, utilities,
furnishings, administrative supplies and the costs of
professional evaluation and treatment are provided at
no cost to the individual projects.
V/hen one considers the nature of the offender who
is accepted into the pretrial intervention program*, the
type and cost of the rehabilitative services he would
have received under pre-existing procedures, and the type
and cost of the services he is receiving under the pre-
trial intervention programs, it becomes obvious that the
costs of the criminal justice system have been increased
rather than decreased as the result of pretrial interven-
tion.
Mot only is there no valid evidence to show that
pretrial intervention saves money, but also there is
no evidence to show that pretrial intervention expedites

the disposition of any cases within the criminal justice
system. Due to the nature of the offenses and the offend-
ers, the majority of the cases disposed of through pre-
trial intervention would have received a minimum of at-
tention Under pre-existing procedures, but under pretrial
intervention the length of time the individual spends
intimately involved with the criminal justice system is
probably increased. Of the total number of offenders
rfJrocessod by the New Jersey courts between September 1
,
1975 and August 31, 1976 less than 1% were disposed of
through pretrial intervention programs. It is simply contrary
to logic to assert that the removal of this small a per-
centage of the less serious offenders from the criminal
justice system expedited the disposition of the remaining
cases.
Although the Supremem Court of New Jersey has attempt-
ed to attain a degree of uniformity among the different
county programs, at the present time there are still nmy
important area3 of dissimiliarity. Probably the most
significant area is that of eligibility. Some programs
aliens
accept applict^iss from all offenders while others have
announced and unannounced restrictions on who may apply.
So long as this difference continues, the New Jersey
Pretrial Intervention Program will be susceptable to
attack by rejected applicants on equal protection grounds.
There are presently cases before the state appellate
will
courts which hopefully resolve this problem.A

VIII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Pretrial Intervention Program in New Jersey
is an extremely expensive piece of judicial legislation.
In its enthusiasm to implement this innovative reform
^
the Supreme Court has transgressed the boundaries out-
lined under the separation of powers doctrine.
It has attampted to usurp the power of the
legislature to define classes of offenders by taking
it upon itself to decriminalize certain offenses it
considers to be victimless, and by giving offenders
the opportunity to avoid prosecution when, in the courts
opinion, the conviction will harm the individual.
By doing this the Courts have, in effect, overridden
the legislature's declarations that individuals who
violate certain norms should be convicted and punished.
By mandating the establishment of programs and
by dictating the scope of services to be provided
by these programs^, the court has effectively made
appropriations decisions that are not rightfully
theirs to make.
The Court has infringed on the prosecutor's
discretion to provide or not to provide alternatives
to prosecution. Traditionally the courts have had
the power to review the actions of officials within
the executive department to prevent gross abuses;
however, this power to review has not been thought to

include the power to supplant in the first instance
the judgement of the court for that of the executive.
Although through court decision it has now been
determined that the prosecutor's decision to reject
an applicant will not be overturned except in the
most extraordinary case, no such restraint has been
forthcoming in other areas. It still remains true
that a prosecutor may not accept the individual
into the program, but rather he may only recommend
enrollment to the court. Likewise, if a prosecutor
is dissatisfied with a participant's performance,
he may only recommend termination. It is thus apparent
that not only has the court significantly infringed
upon the executive powers merely by the establishment
of the program, but they have usurped the executive
powers to divert and to terminate.
Pretrial Intervention does not, contrary to the
Chief Justice's remarks, intervene to remove certain
accused defendants £or the revolving door corr©ption
and futility of imprisonment. In fact, what it does
is to act as a "creaming" process whereby minor
offenders who would have received minimum sentences
(not usually including confinement) are diverted
without a conviction from the criminal justice
system. There is simply no basis for saying that any
significant number of PTI participants would have been
imprisoned had not a PTI program been available. All
-ISO-

available evidence indicates that these individuals
would have been quickly processed through the system
and received at the most a period of ineffectively
supervised probation.
Rather than fecilitating the expeditious dis-
position of cases within the criminal justice system,
the pretrial intervention program in New Jersey has
imposed an additional appendage on the system which
can only complicate the processing of each participant's
case, and which cannot have any significant effect
on the speed of the disposition of the other cases
within the system. Less than 1% of the offenders
within the system are disposed of through PTI.
One can only speculate as to what the effect on the
system would have been had all the resources devoted
to PTI been used to increase the staffs of the prosecution
and the probation departments, but it is certainly
possible that had this been done, a greater number
of cases would have received more expeditious handling.
Not only does it appear as though PTI does hot
expedite the disposition of offenders, but it also
appears obvious that it imposes an additional fin-
ancial burden on the system. If as the Chief Justice
alleged, PTI saves the taxpayers money because the cost
per defendant is less &han the cost of processing
an inmate or a probationer, you would expect to see
the overall cost of the system reduced. In fact,
~/3{-

just the opposite occurred. The staff and budget of
each and every county criminal justice system was
increased because of PTI, and no net savings resulted.
In fact, when one looks at the extensive procedures
involved and compares them with the treatment that the
same defendnat probably would have otherwise received,
it is not surprising that the cost of the system has
been increased.
If we could determine that pretrial intervention
was achieving its primary goal of rehabilitation, the
increased costs might be tolerable; however, it is
readily apparent that there is no evidence available
on which to make this determination.
The Chief Justice stated that the true test of
the program's effectiveness was recidivism. He claimed
that continual tracking since 1972 indicated a New
Jersey recidivism rate of l\..l% 9 and he compared this
with 91% of prison inmates who had previous arrests
before their present offense.
First and foremost, it must be stated that
recidivism is a totally irrelevant indicator, for
it neither shows to what degree the services provided
rehabilitated the defendant, nor does it show to what
extent expeditious disposition has been achieved.
Not only is it irrelevant but, as used by the
Chief Justice it is also inaccurate and misleading.
First of all the Chief Justice contended that
-132.-

this figure was the result of continued tracking since
1972. In fact, only one of the six counties whose figures
were considered had been in existence since 1972 and that
275
county showed a rate of recidivism of 12%. The rearrests
from which these recidivism rates were devised only included
rearrests for which the individual was finger-printed and
thus did not include the vast majority of offenses which
are classified non- indie table and disorderly persons
offenses. An individual could be rearrested 10 times and
so long as he wasn't finger-printed
?
he would not be considered
a recidivist by the Chief Justice.
Secondly, the comparison is misleading. Not only
' does it compare the records of two totally dissimilar
groups, but it also compares different records. In the case
of the PTI participant, we are saying that our records do
not show any subsequent arrest for which the ex-participant
was finger-printed . In the other case, we are saying that
the inmate was at some prior time arrested for something
which might or might not have been serious enough to have
caused him to be finger-printed.
Recidivism should not therefore be used to evaluate
the effectiveness of PTI prograns.
If we disregard recidivism as our evaluator, what
then may we use?
- 133 -

So long as the goals are rehabilitation and expeditious
processing, it will be necessary to use separate evaluators.
Before we set these goals however, we should attempt to
determine if they are attainable. Available evidence would
clearly indicate that the medical model of the criminal
justice system has been discredited, and that it is not
possible to rehabilitate offenders through criminal justice
processes. Until reliable information is produced to
show that these types of offenders need to be rehabilitated
and that we possess the means to achieve rehabilitation
within the allowable time restraints, rehabilitation
should be discarded a3 a goal of Pretrial Intervention.
Pretrial Intervention and other forms of formalized
pretrial diversion are usually thought to be lineal descendants
of police and prosecutorial discretion. The primary
justification for the exercise of this discretion has
always been the need of the prosecutor to allocate his re-
sources to achieve maximum effectiveness and expeditious
disposition of serious criminal cases. A co-equal need
justifying the exercise of the discretion has been the need
to impart some flexibility to the system in order to allow
the system to make the most appropriate response to the
particular offense and the offender. PTI should adopt the
goal of its predecessors.
- 13U -

These two goals of expeditious disposition and
system flexibility would be co-equal in importance
and at least to some extent they would overlap.
As the caseload in a prosecutor's office increases,
it seems logical that if he is unable to get additional
resources, he would have to redirect his existing
resources to the most serious offenses and the most
recalcitrant offenders. In doing so, in the absence
of a program such as PTI, he would have to ignore or
downgrade the charges against the minor offenders
and hope that these individuals did n£t thereby develop
disrespect for the law and subsequently commit a more
serious crime. If the prosecutor could divert an in-
dividual to a PTT-type program, he could retain juris-
diction over the individual thus giving him the
opportunity to more accurately evaluate the offenders
nature. If the individual remained out of trouble,
he could be dismissed, and hopefully, the experience
of having lived under the fear of prosecution for a
period of time would cause him not to have lost respect
for the law.
As the caseload dropped, the prosecutor would
divert fewer people, for now some of the less serious
offenders would be convicted and punished by the
courts.
Under both a heavy and a light case load the
prosecutor would have at his disposal a tool to tailor
-|3S~

the response of the criminal justice system to the
particular offender in light of the charged offense,
and by maintaining jurisdiction over the offender
for six months the prosecutor could more accurately
determine what the appropriate system response should
be. In some cases, dismissal might be appropriate,
while in others a reduced charge or a particular
plea bargained sentence might be the most appropriate
disposition. In other cases, the period of evaluation
might reveal that no leniency is appropriate and
therefore the original prosecution would be reactivated.
As to the first goal, it would seem relatively
simple to determine if, in fact, the PTI system was
effective. If, by increased utilization of PTI the
prosecutor was able to maintain a reasonable standard
for timely disposition in the face of an increased
caseload, the PTI program would have to be judged
effective j, while if he were unable to do so, the
effectiveness of the program would be questionable.
An increase or decrease in the crime rate would be
regarded as an indicator of how effective or ineffective
the system as a whole is.
Any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of
achieving the second goal would be entirely subjective.
If the prosecutor felt t]\at he was able to more
appropriately exercise his discretion as the result
of diversion, the program would be deemed successful.
-/S6~

Under a system with these redefined goals, it
would seem appropriate to return to the prosecutor the
power to accept or reject applicants in the first
instance. His decision would only be reviewable
for a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The
prosecutor's decision not to dismiss or to abide by
any other previously decided upon conditional dis-
position would be reviewable, but in light of the
fact that the unconvicted participant had already
been subjected to a measure of control, we should
require additional safeguards to protect the participant's
interests. It is recommended that if the prosecutor
does not honor his original agreement he should be
required to affirmatively show at a hearing that he
has a rational basis for his action.
Although pretrial intervention has often been
equated to probation and in fact it has been called
"pretrial probation", it is merely a formalization
of long-standing discretionary practices. By attempting
to graft a rehabilitative goal onto this procedure,
the proponents of PTI have weakened their own credi-
bility. PTI has a place in the criminal justice
system, but just as it has begun to be recognized
that prison and probation do not rehabilitate, so will
it eventually be recognized that PTI cannot achieve
this elusive goal. When the proponents of PTI under-
stand this, they will have taken the critical steps
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186. Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, reh. den. 351 U.S. 958
TT9F5T:
187. Rodriguez v San Antonio School District , 93 S. Ct 1 278 (1973).
188. Salsburg v. Maryland , 3I4.6 U.S. SkS (
1
95k ) •
189. Monograph on Legal Issues, supra n. 5> 33-3U*
190. Supra n. 13^.
191. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court allowed different
criminal procedural practices to continue in various
counties in Maryland because the procedures were under
state law discretionary with the different counties.
Thus so long as £he questions of whether or not to estab-
lish a program^v.'hatoroblems the program should address
are discretionary^with the counties, it would seem
permissible for variations to exist.
192. s Some counties interpret the phrase " any 6rime "
as a limitation. They feel that individuals charged with
disorderly persons offenses and other nonindictable
offenses can be excluded for these do not constitute
crimes. There are presently cases before the Appellate
N-m

192. (con f t) Division of the Superior court challanging
this on equal protection grounds. Regardless of the
outcome of this claim, it would appear that the Supreme
Court did not intend when it published the Official Guide-
lines that they should be interpreted in such a restrict-
ive manner. Guideline 3(c) specifically states, " Jurisdic«
tion: Only defendants charged with criminal or penal
offenses in the criminal or municipal courts of the
Stae of New Jersey may be enrolled pursuant to R. 3:28".
(emphasis added) Guideline 3(d) only excludes those
charged with minor offenses where the likely disposition
would be a suspended sentence without probation or a
fine , (emphasis added)
193. See preceding footnote.
1 9I4.. Official Guideline 3(i), supra n. 12. Not also that
the Supreme Court has held the nature of the offense
may be the sole basis for the prosecutor's or program
director's rejection. Leonardis II , supra n. 126, 328.
See also State v Turmninelii , Superior Court Appellate
Division A- 3362-76 decided Nov. 23, 1977 (unpublished





(Dec. 20, 1977) where the Appellate Division reversed
the trial courts order admitting the applicant over the
,
objection of the prosecutor and the program director.
1 95* Leonardis I, supra n. 126, 102.
196. Bergen, Hudson, Mercer, Morris.
197. Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland, Essex, Gloucester,
Hunterdon, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, Passaic, Salem,
Somerset, and Union.
198. Burlington and Camden.
199. Camden -T. A. S.C.
200. Newark T.A.S.C.
201 . Jersey City ARP.
202. As previously noted the Guidelines state " every
defendant who has been accused of any crime shall be
eligible". See text of not 192, supra.
203. Note 187 and 1 88 supra. See also Baxs trom v Pierold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966). ~~
—
201+. Sherb ert v Verner
,




205. Dandridge v Williams, 397 U.S. I4.71 (1970).
206. Monograph on Legal Issues, supra n. 5> 32-33.
207. N.J. CONST, art I, sec. 10.
208. Barker v Wingo , ij.07 U.S. 51 5, 527-528 (1972).
209. 131 N.J. Super. \\Ql\. (App. Div.), cert, denied, 66 N.J.
329 (19714-).
210. State v Szima
, 70 N.J. 1 96 (1976).
211. In Camden and Mercer counties the program administrators
interviewed indicated that this was not a problem for
the defendant is never removed from the trial calandar
and at the present time it would take a defendant longer
to come to trial than it does for him to complete the
PTI program.
212. Braay v. United States . 397 U.S. 1\\2 (1970).
213. North Carolina v Alford , lj.00 U.S. 26 (1970).
211|. Id. ,31.
21 §• Miranda v Arizona , 38I4. U.S. i|36 (1966); State v Kremens ,
32 N.J. 303 (1965) after remand 57 N.J. 309 (1971 ).
215. Johnson v Zerbs t 58 S.Ct. 1019. But see Schneckloth v
Bustamonte
, 93 S.Ct. 20lj.1
.
217. State v Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971).
218. Katz v United States , 389 U.S. 3I4.7 (1967); Schneckloth
v Bustaraonte, ill 2 U.S. 21 8 (1973); State v Johnson ,
£8 "W7TTU& (1976).
219. But see Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process:
Some Constitutional Considerations, supra n. 102 where
the author argues that such a hearing would be appropriate.
220. The comments accompanying Official Guideline 6 specifically
note that under the liberal discovery rules of New Jersey
the defendant would have such a chance to discover and
evaluate the evidence against him. Official Guidelines,
supra n. 12, ll\.,
22\ • See Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process:
Some Constitutional Considerations, supra n. 102; and
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221. (con ! t) Proposed Guidelines, supra n. 11, 81 both
advocating such representation. See also Monograph on
Legal Issues, supra n. 5> 10-11.
222. Official Guidelines, supra n. 12, llj. #
22%» Application For Enrollment and Participation Agreement
form issued by the Administrative Office of the Courts,
State of New Jersey.
22l|.. All counties checked used the standard form provided
by the Administrative Office of the Courts, Form PT-8B
(l/75)Rev.
22$. Standard form issued by the Administrative Office of the
Courts entitled "TERMINATION NOTICE" and sent out by
the program on letterhead stationary of the Superior
Court.
226. Official Guidelines, supra n. 12, Guideline 2 t
227. Id., Guideline 3(i).
228. This is similar to the situation where an incarcerated
individual is seeking parole release. It has been con-
sistantly held that in that situation there is no con-
stitutional right to a due process hearing. See
Menechino v Oswald
, Lj_30 F. 2d ij.03 (2d Cir, 1973) and
Puchalski v New jersey State Parole Bd.
, 55 N.J. 113
*(T^6"9T"
,
cert. den. 39b U.S. 93« (1970).
229* Revocation of parole and probation require due process
safeguards. See Morris sey v Brewer , I4.O8 U.S. 14-71, (1972)
(parole) and Gagnon V Scarpelli , Lj.11 U.S. 778 (1973)
(probation).
230. Leonardis I , supra n. 126, 122.
231. Supra notes 226 and 227 with accompanying text.
232. lij-5 N.J. Super. 257 (Law 1977).
233. Id. ,260.
231+. Leonardis II , supra n. 126, 382-83.
235« Id, (emphasis in original).
236. Id.,38Ij-.
237. 153 N.J. Super. 336 ( Law 1977).
f^-lT

238, In State v Masucci, N.J. Super (LAW 1978)
the defendant was deniedenrollment and appealed.
Pursuant to the appeal his attorney served a subpoena
on the program director and the prosecutor. The subpoena
sought (1 ) to take the testimony of the author of the
adverse admission evaluation: (2) to inspect and copy
any and all adverse statements allegedly made by the
applicant; (3) to examine the probation department's
file concerning the applicant's juvenile record; (Ij.)
to examine any confessions or admissions made by the
defendant; and (5) to dicover the names of persons
interviewed by the author of the adverse report and to
obtain copies of any statements made by them.
The defendant's theory was that he needed this in-
formation to show that the evaluation was wrong and that
thus his rejection was improper.
The court held that any errors in the evaluation
could be corrected by the defendant submitting the corredt
facts to the court, and although usually matters that
the director considers must be shown to the defendant,
in some cases they need not be if to do so would embarass
or endanger the source. The court did allow the defend-
ant to view his juvenile record.
This case is another restriction on the defendant's
means of showing that a rejection decision is improper.
239. Supra n. 228.
See procedures for rejection discussed in Section VI,
infra. Each individual is given the opportunity to
present matters either in writing or in person showing
why he or she should not be rejected, The rejected
applicant is advised in writing of the reasons for his
or her rejection and is given the opportunity to appeal
the decision to the court. Although the burden on
anpeal is extremely heavy, it would seem as though
due process requirements are being met both in theory
and in practice.
Gagnon v Scarpelli , supra n. 229.
2J|2. Goldberg v Kelly , 397 U.S. 35I4. (1970).
2I4.3. Morrissey v Brewer, supra n. 229.
2U4, Caramico v Sec, of Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 509 F2d
53IT11inT17n~s"j^ i|b1TT2d 359 , 3^2
.
2i|_5. Leonardis II, supra n. 126, note 1 2 at 383.
2I4.6. R 3:28(c)(1), supra n. 13.
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2kl. R 3: 28(c) (2), supra n. 13.
2i4_8. R 3:28(c)(3), supra n. 13.
2ij.9. Id. (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251 • Form letter issued by the Administrative Office of the
Courts. This letter was being used in all the counties
visited.
252. Supra n. 225.
253. Mr Donald Phelan.
2Sk» Crime in New Jersey, 1976 Crime Report, 12.
255. The majority of the following information was obtained
during personal interviews with the Program Coordinator,
Mr. R.H. Aaronson and the judge primarily concerned with
criminal matters in Burlington County, the Honorable
Judge Kramer. See interview form Appendix B.
256. State Law Enforcement?Sgen§y which is charged with the
responsibility of administering and distributing federal
funds.
257. This is true in all the programs and thus any statements
made by the Chief Justice purporting to state the cost per
participant is inaccurate.
258. 'Supra n 12 at 1 .
259. Supra, note 192.
260. The Program Coordinator feels that it would be a breach
of the programs confidentiality guarantees to allow the
prosecutor to see the entire file; however, it is difficult
to understand how the prosecutor can correctly perform
his function if he is denied this information.
261. This procedure eliminates many of the lesser indictable
offenders who would seem to be prime candidates for the
PTI program.
262. The following information was obtained during personal
interviews with the Program Coordinator, Mr. Richard
Achey. See interview form Appendix B.
263. Crime in New Jersey, 1976 Uniform Crime Report, 18.
26/4. Released on Own Recognizance,,
N-n

265* Although Mr. Achey is designated as the Program Coordinator,
the Director of the Program has little if any effect on the
operation of the program. Mr. Achey refers to himself as
Doctor.however, the sole basis for the title is his J.D. degree.
266. Thus 53*5% of those on whom rejection/acceptance decisions
have been made have been rejected.
267. 3% of those enrolled.
268. 98% of those enrolled.
269. The Program Coordinator refused to estimate the case load
and would not allow interviews with his staff.
270. Crime in New Jersey, 1976 Uniform Crime Report, 13-Ilj_,
271 • The following information was obtained during personal
interviews with the Assistant Program Coordinator, Mr.
Nick Carugno who has the day to day operational control
of the program.
272. Crime in New Jersey, 1976 Uniform Crime Report, 1 6—1 7-
273» The following information was obtained during personal
interviews with the Program Director, Ms. Rita Douglas,
and her research assistant Suzanne Karkut.
27i+. Printed copy of the State of the Judiciary Address, supra,
n. 19.
275. Information obtained from copy of the briefing information
provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts to
the Chief Justice for his State of the Judiciary Address.
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QUESTION k I HE
I. INITIATION OF PROGRAM
A, Who initiated .program? When?
b. Who developed, program ?
C. Who submitted .proposal and when ?
D. Was there any dissent ? Who ?
E. Request copy of Proposal.
F. Any changes made by Supreme Court ?
G. When was approval obtained ?
H. When did program begin screening ?
I. How was program initially funded ?
II. STAFF
A, How many on staff ?
B, What are their duties and titles?
C. What is their prior experience ?
D. What are their salaries ?
E. Where did these positions come from ? Were these positions
taken from probation department or other government, or
are they in addition to existing stall's ?
F. What has- been your staff turnover ?
III. BUDGET
A. What is total budget ?
B. How funded ?





i). Was budget of other county or court unit decreased as
the result of the establishment of PTI ? By how much ?
JE What financial support is received from other governmental
or nor ;overnuiMj ual entities ?

F. What services including space and furnishings are provided
by other entities and what is the cost to PTI of these ?
G, Has there been or is there planned a cost effectiveness study ?
IV. ADMISSION
A. How do following defendants receive notice of program ?
Issued Summones
Arrested during non-court hours
Arrested or summoned in area other that where PTI office
located
B. Do you use a referral form ? Request copy.
C. Who fills it out ?
D. Do you use initial interview form? Request copy.
E. Who fills it out ?
F. Do you accept:
Indictable Disorderly Persons
Non- indictable Ordinance Violations
Drug
G. If your program does not accept cny of the above types
are they nonetheless allowed to apply for the program
and are their applications forwarded to the prosecutor
H. How many people have been referred to PTI ?
I. Total number given initial interview ?
J» Are individuals told not to bother ?
JJ. Is there a period of informal participation and investigation V
How Long
What type of participation
How many are terminated during tbi s period
Own request
At programs request
L. What effect dees participation have on chance for bail or ROR ?








Prior PTI Participation in and out of county
N. Is employer contacted
0. Are family or friends contacted
V." OPERATION OF PROGRAM
A. What type services does your program provide ?
B. What is the client/ counselor ratio
C. V/ho determines what program is necessary for a particular client ?
D. What type supervision is given client during informal participatio:
E. what type supervision is given during formal participation ?
F. What affirmative action is taken to see how participant is
doing with family* friends, job or school before decision
to terminate or dismiss is made ?
G. V-.hat is basis for deciding that man has successfully
completed program ?
H. How is staff supervised to insure uniformity and adherence ?
VI. TERMINATION
A. Plow many are terminated during formal participation ?
B. 'What are reason.; for terminating ?

C What are procedure 3 for terminating during :
Informal Stage
Formal Stage
D. Is a participant given informal warnings of unsatisfactory
participation before receiving formal warning ?
E. V/hat number and percent of those formally notified resist
decision ?
F. V/hat number and percent of these initial decisions to
terminate are changed if the participant resists ?
G. What number and percent contest formal recommendation
to terminate ?
H. What actually happens to those terminated ?
VII. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM
A. Has there been an evaluation of programs effectiveness ?
B. Request Copy
C. Who conducted evaluation ?
D. What cril?era was used for measuring success?
E. How long are participants followed?






G. Does cost per participant include :
Your budget
Services provided by others
Court and pros, time
H. Ey what figure is the total cost divided ?
I. Doe3 total of participants include those informally terminated ?
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